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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1074



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INTERNATIONAL

U.S. GLOOMY VISION OF FUTURE REFUTED

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Sep 80 p 4

[B.Ts. Urianis comment: "The World Will Be Better"]

[Text] The U.S. EPA and State Department have prepared for President J. Carter a report on the state of the world in the year 2000. This study, which is sustained in gloomy tones, predicts that in the next 30 years the world will encounter poverty, environmental pollution, overpopulation and soil erosion and depletion as a result of which 20 percent of cultivated land will become desert.

The editorial office asked Doctor of Economics B.Ts. Urianis, deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council, to comment on this report.

The study of U.S. Government experts provides a gloomy picture of the life of our planet in the year 2000. But the main cause of a possible deterioration in the situation in the world--the intensifying arms race--is completely lost sight of here. If it continues, it will really be difficult to count on favorable prospects. Take Japan, for example. It has been able to make a strong economic spurt ahead, overtaking, among others, the United States in automobile production, chiefly because its military spending has been relatively little. If the world could be spared the militarist burden, it would be transformed. The peace-loving states are making tremendous efforts for an abatement of the arms race. The SALT-II Treaty should have become a considerable step forward in this direction. But Washington has postponed its ratification indefinitely.

The American scholars' study pays much attention to demographic problems. But the contemporary world's rapid population growth is not, as they assert, the main reason for the poverty of the developing countries, although it undoubtedly is holding back their economic and cultural development. Yet even now a decline in the rate of growth of world population can be observed: from an annual 2 percent to 1.8 percent as a result of the spread of "birth control." A further decline in the rate should lead to the stabilization of the population at a level of 11-12 billion by the middle of the next century.

Even with today's level of consumption, approximately three times as much food as is produced currently will be needed for this mass of people. Many people in the West contend that the problem is insoluble. The report says, among other things, that by the year 2000 some 20 percent of cultivated land will have become desert. But the area sown to grain crops in the world as a whole is increasing. Whereas in 1969-1971 it constituted 702 million hectares, in 1979 it amounted to 763 million hectares, that is, almost 10 percent more.

The potential for an increase in yield also is far from exhausted. In the world as a whole the cereals' yield in the period 1969-1979 increased from 17.8 quintals per hectare to 20.2 quintals, that is, 13.5 percent. A further increase in yield is perfectly possible since it is several times above the world average in many countries. Furthermore, agrotechnics is still at a very low level in a number of regions of the planet. It is also possible to achieve an increase in the dimensions of the sown area which produces a harvest twice and even three times a year.

The economically developed capitalist states and also the oil-producing countries of the Near and Middle East must realize that they themselves have a vital interest in the economic upsurge of states with a backward economy. After all, according to our calculations, 13 million persons out of the total of 56 million who died perished from starvation and malnutrition in 1979 alone. The deterioration of the developing countries' food situation is leading to the spread of serious infectious diseases which could perfectly possibly spread to the economically developed states also.

Unfortunately, the North-South dialog is proving insufficiently productive. The wealthy capitalist powers prefer to get off with handouts, granting the poor countries a negligible proportion of their national income--less than the 1 percent determined by a decision of the 1968 UN conference in Bangkok.

The economic upsurge of the developing countries will lead to their industrial and agrarian development, which will be capable of accomplishing the impending tasks. Given the present correlation of the economic situation, the gap can only widen. Whereas prior to World War II the income of the developed countries was 8 times that of the economically backward countries, it is now 12 times and could in the future grow to 20 times.

In the Third World countries the number of unemployed and partially employed has risen to roughly half a billion. If the current trend is maintained, this indicator could be 1 billion by the year 2000. Under the economic system operating in a number of these countries a person frequently throughout his life does not even make good the expenditure on his education and upkeep, which is leading to the "unprofitability" of a whole generation and is ultimately increasing the indigence of peoples.

The calculations of many Western scholars to the effect that the Earth could feed 50-70 and even 100 billion people can only confuse. In this category we should place primarily the Anglo-Australian economist Colin

Clarke, who in this respect has a more vivid imagination than his namesake--the science-fiction writer Arthur Clarke. Colin Clark is confident that, given maximum food standards, it is possible to provide for 35 million people. Other specialists go even further, believing it possible to obtain from 1 hectare a harvest capable of providing food for 40 people. With this norm merely the existing cultivated area could feed 54 billion people.

At the other pole there are scholars who hold completely opposite views. Thus Prof R. Milliken, Nobel Prize winner for chemistry, for example, believes that it is essential that the population be reduced at least four-fold for a happy life on Earth.

The real prospects should be interposed between these two opposite views, namely: a continuing increase in the population for a further 100 years approximately until it stabilizes as a result of the abatement in the rate of growth. A tripling of the numbers of mankind organically ensues even from the existing population. But the future growth in yield and the sown areas will be capable of securing a tripling of production. This will be possible given a satisfactory solution of the North-South problem.

The report justifiably points to the possibility of an increase in infant mortality owing to starvation and disease. It is currently 10-12 times higher in the developing countries than the states which are the most advanced in the sanitary-hygiene respect. An increase in infant mortality could be reflected in a halt to the increase in life expectancy, despite all the optimistic calculations being built for the year 2000 by the UN Demography Department.

Even now the brakes have been applied to the increase in average life expectancy in a number of countries. The gene pool--man's most precious possession--could deteriorate and the "pathological load" therein could increase if the children of Asia and Africa grow up half-starved.

And it is not just a matter of infant mortality. In the overwhelming part of the contemporary world a huge proportion of adults dies long before the exhaustion of the biological potential contained in the human organism under the conditions of its normal functioning.

The report deals with ecological problems, which really are a serious threat to mankind. The highly industrialized countries, chiefly the United States, are "stealing" the oxygen which belongs to all people and are causing a considerable deterioration in the composition of the Earth's atmosphere. Money, money and more money, which is being used for militaristic purposes in huge amounts, is needed to fight this. The American scientist B. Commoner correctly observes that "peace between people has to precede peace between people and nature."

Thus the future of the world comes down to the problems of war and peace. Curbing imperialism and not allowing it to spend insane resources in preparation for plunging the planet into a state of catastrophe--such is the

task confronting mankind. Only given the accomplishment of this task will we have reason to hope for happiness by the year 2000.

The world should not be viewed through dark glasses, but nor can we base ourselves, as Academician D. Gvishiani colorfully put it, on "incompetent optimism" and see everything through rose-colored spectacles. It is necessary to throw away the spectacles altogether and view the world in a manner which clearly foresees all the difficulties in the way of surmounting present-day contradictions. But we are optimists by nature and firmly hope that the world of the year 2000 will be not worse but better than the one in which we now live. We believe in the successes of science and technology, in the intelligence of statesmen and the rationalization of the entire world economic order.

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CSO: 1800

INTERNATIONAL

U.S.-ISRAELI STAND ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION CONDEMNED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA political observer V. Kudryavtsev: "The Palestinians' Just Cause"]

[Excerpts] American diplomacy has an amazing capacity for drawing absolutely untenable conclusions from real facts. This occurs owing to a manifest overestimation of its possibilities in the modern world, in which the correlation of forces is taking shape increasingly palpably not to the advantage of the overseas pretenders to world hegemony. This was also the case with the evaluation of the recent extraordinary special session of the UN General Assembly on the Palestinian question.

U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie was able to say nothing against the General Assembly resolution other than to charge that it was "one-sided." And this is asserted by the official representative of the United States, which all the time maintains over and over that the United States' most important task in the Near East is the defense of Israel and its interests, that is, the interests of an aggressor. A fine one-sidedness when 112 UN members voted for the resolution condemning Israel and only 7, including the United States, voted against.

All these evasions are explained by the fact that the facts prove the contrary, and there is no escaping this fact. Reassessing its possibilities, the U.S. ruling circles, following the UN vote on the events in Afghanistan, evidently imagined that the entire Muslim world could be used in an anti-Soviet respect. But they forgot that the provocative distortion of the truth concerning the events in Afghanistan in daily propaganda could not have a lasting effect and would sooner or later turn against the authors themselves.

The vote at the extraordinary special session on the resolution on the Palestinian question graphically showed that on such a most acute issue as the situation in the Near East the majority of Muslim countries is opposed to U.S. policy, which is directed against the interests of the Muslim countries. The unbidden "patrons" and "protectors" of Islam were impressively

rebuffed at the session. It should be noted that the United States' ally--Israel--against its bidding--did everything in its power to expose the sham "pro-Islamism"...of Washington's ruling circles. This is indicated if only by the fact of the Israeli Knesset's outrageous decision to declare Jerusalem the capital of the state of Israel. What remains of E. Muskie's assertion concerning the one-sidedness of UN resolutions? It is precisely U.S. policy which is one-sided, candidly and openly encouraging Israeli expansionism against the Arab states and peoples.

The United States hastened to declare the only just adopted UN resolutions a "matter of history" and intends to consign them to the archives because the vote at the extraordinary session was in fact simultaneously a vote against the Camp David agreements. The session's decisions in fact showed that what should be consigned to the archives is Camp David, which is truly becoming a "matter of history" since there is not nor can there be any future for it, as is now becoming clear to an increasingly wide circle of countries. The results of the UN vote confirmed yet again the truth of the statement of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, who emphasized: "The question arises: is it not time to have done with the protracted fuss of the anti-Arab policy of separate deals? Has the time not come to return the business of a Near East settlement to the sole correct channel--the path of the collective efforts of all parties concerned, including, it stands to reason, the PLO?"

The General Assembly decision confirmed yet again the sole correct conclusion that peace and security in the Near East cannot become a reality without a just solution of the Palestine problem. And a just solution of this question is inconceivable without the Arab people of Palestine's right to self-determination, right up to the creation of a national sovereign state. This is the truth, and everyone who speaks against it, as do the United States, Israel and, together with them, al-Sadat's Egypt, is deliberately consenting to an intensification and extension of the Near East crisis. The cause of this exacerbation are the Camp David agreements, which not only ignore the interests of the Palestinian people but are also intended to put an end to this problem by way of Israel's final annexation of Palestinian land. This position, we repeat, can only further exacerbate the situation in the Near East, but because of this the Palestinian problem will become even closer and more vital for all the Near East countries and for all countries supporting peace and security. F. [Kan] (Senegal), chairman of the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, declared after the session that "the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the creation of an independent state enjoys widespread support throughout the world. Only Israel and the United States oppose it."

The cause of the Arab people of Palestine is the vital cause of all the world's peace-loving countries. The discussion of the Palestinian question at the UN General Assembly session and, particularly, the results of the voting are also instructive in that they show the hopelessness of the attempts of the U.S. ruling circles to compel other countries to follow in the channel

of American imperialist policy. Neither the concentration of huge naval and assault-landing forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, nor the creation of new bases around the Near and Middle East in Oman, Kenya and Somalia, nor the cobbling together of a "rapid deployment force" nor any other threats to use armed force can compel other countries to act contrary to their national interests. The United States is counting in vain on the effect of the moment, setting these countries against the Soviet Union and other socialist community states. Other than confusion, nothing will come of this, just as it will not be possible to win over to its side the world's Muslim countries by way of the artificial inflation of the "Afghan question."

The discussion of the Palestine problem in the United Nations demonstrated even more forcefully the sorry role in store for the countries which have followed in the channel of the United States' imperialist policy. Egypt has not only found itself isolated, it has become a blind tool of the American-Israeli aggressive bloc directed against the interests of the overwhelming majority of Arab countries and in fact against the Muslim world.

The General Assembly's decisions on the Palestine question are striking evidence of a quest for a way out of the complex and dangerous situation in the Near East that has been created by the policy of the United States and Israel. They are a warning to the American hegemonists and their Israeli assistants about the hopelessness of their attempts to make the Near East their patrimony.

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INTERNATIONAL

LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN AFRICA DESCRIBED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 6,
Jun 80 pp 64-74

[Article by Ye. Taratrin: "Africa: The Liberation Movement and Imperialist Intrigues"]

[Text] This year is an illustrious one for the peoples of the African continent. The 20th anniversary of the "Year of Africa" has come. Two decades ago, 17 colonies acquired independence at the same time, and the number of liberated countries totalled 26. On 1 January 1980, there were 50 of them. The national liberation movement in Africa continues to expand and intensify. Its basic goals during the present stage are: the strengthening of the national sovereignty of the young states, the achievement of economic independence by them, and the solving of the tasks of accelerated advancement by means of social progress. In a number of countries, national liberation movements -- having solved the task of eliminating direct colonial rule and achieving state independence -- have developed into national democratic revolutions which have been called upon to solve the very sharp contradictions between the political status of the young states and their growing role in world affairs, and their continuing economic dependence on imperialism. In general, the liberation struggle on the continent is merging more and more into the economic and social sphere and acquiring a distinctly anti-imperialist trend.

The new stage in the liberation struggle is no less complicated than the previous one since methods by which the former enslaved peoples can break away from the clutches of the neocolonial exploitation and dependence system and overcome within an historically visible period the centuries-old economic, scientific and technical, social, and cultural backwardness, are being determined during it.

The profound social improvements, which are taking place on the African continent, are evoking the furious resistance of the neocolonialists and

small assemblies and the incessant attempts of imperialism to preserve and to strengthen as far as possible its positions in this part of the world.

What are the means and resources which imperialism is using in trying to put out the flames of the liberation struggle in Africa and turn back the wheel of the revolutionary process leading to the complete liberation of the former colonial countries and peoples?

1

A. The "Cold War" policy employed by Imperialist circles to weaken the national liberation movement in Africa (just as in Asia and Latin America) and to destroy the friendly relations of the liberated countries with the socialist countries and other countries of the socialist community, as well as to isolate them. It is being utilized in the notorious myth of "the Soviet threat". As L. N. Brezhnev has pointed out, attempts "to putting the Soviet Union in the line of that country and the peoples' struggle for independence and national progress as the intrigues and machinations of Moscow" are "outrageous".

Obviously, this is far from being a new method. Anticolonial and anti-imperialist movements have used it for a long time in the struggle against the "Cold War" policy and Marxist-Leninist ideology. For more than 40 years, imperialist ideologists have tried to distort and discredit the Soviet Union's foreign policy and ascribe an "aggressive" intent to it. In the propaganda arsenal of imperialism, the terms "red militarism", "the dehumanization of mankind", "Moscow's hand", "export of revolution", and the like have become commonplace. Turning to history, it is sufficient to recall that "war" was not even the "militarization" of Germany was carried out by the "Cold War" policy -- they gave the "green light" to the Soviet attack on and the "transferable" attack on the Hitlerites and their satellites in the USSR -- was conducted after the defeat of fascism, the "cold war" was conducted and NAZI and other aggressive forces were created under the snake's skin of the "Soviet threat" myth.

Now, covered by the "Soviet threat" myth, the jerboas of international reaction are trying to frustrate the process of relaxing tensions in the world, preventing a halt in the arms race, and hinder the conclusion of an agreement on halting strategic weapons. Neocolonialist circles are also using the same method, interpreting the progressive improvements and changes which have developed the former colonial "periphery" as "the machinations of communism."

Imperialist propaganda functions here in two directions. First, it maintains that the "Soviet threat" has a "global nature" and is equally being spread both in the "Western civilized world" and in the young states. Second, it emphasizes that this "threat" is a special danger for these states since they do not possess sufficient "defensive" resources. Both these directions, of course, are closely interconnected.

The fact is that during the present stage neocolonialism -- apart from striving to strengthen the exploitation of the peoples of the liberated countries and increase the streams of multi-million dollar profits from there -- is trying to spread capitalism as a management system to an ever larger part of the colonial "periphery". The attempts of the imperialist circles to strengthen their type of class agreements with the national bourgeoisie of the young states or with the bureaucratic and technocratic groups whose importance in the liberated countries has recently grown, spring from this. Using the deepening class differentiation and the growth in social contradictions, the neocolonialists are striving to convince the ruling cliques in a number of liberated states that the frequent actions of the broad masses against their rule are allegedly inspired from without. It is further emphasized that under these conditions the West, with whom they must conclude an alliance, is the only "support" for the national bourgeoisie.

They justify the suppression of the uprising by the local populace in the Zaïre provinces of 1977 and 1978 with the myth of the "Soviet-Cuban threat". At the time, it served as the main argument for the inspirers and supporters of the army action against revolutionary Ethiopia. More recently, the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan are being laid at the door of "Soviet expansionism." Under cover of such fantasies, imperialist circles are interfering in the internal affairs of Angola, Ethiopia, democratic Afghanistan, and other liberated countries. They are training and equipping groups among the counter-revolutionary rabble and sending their hirelings there.

The fact that an understanding of the historical necessities of capitalism is growing in the young states and that an ever larger number of them are selecting a progressive development path and a socialist orientation evokes special anxiety in the neocolonialists. As is known, the Soviet Union is moving forward in the developing world on the side of the forces of progress and treats them as its friends. That is why the neocolonialists, in striving to undermine the deepening ties and cooperation of the liberated countries, which have a socialist orientation, with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states and evoke distrust for them, are also using the myth of the "Soviet threat". In doing this, both the vacillating social layers and groups existing in these countries and the pro-West regimes in neighboring states are being enlisted as objects for falsification. The international help and support, provided by the USSR to the progressive forces in this part of the planet, are passed off as an expression of "Soviet aggression", as the striving of the Soviet Union "to penetrate and consolidate itself" in the continent of Africa and Asia.

During recent years, the Beijing hegemonists have actively included themselves in this campaign. Their voice noticeably stands out in the anticommunist choir. Chinese propaganda is trying with special persistence to spread the threat of "the danger of Soviet expansion" in the Middle and Near East and on the African continent, trying to drive a wedge between the young states and their natural ally -- the socialist commonwealth -- and to join the liberated countries one by one with the forces of neocolonialism and hegemonism.

The second main tactic of isolating military "cooperation" on the developing countries has already been clearly outlined. With its help, imperialism is trying to create a system of long-term military technical dependence by the young states of the Eastern powers; acquire a social support and allies in their armed forces especially in the officer corps; transform individual countries into a particular type of gendarmerie, defenders of their interests in that region of the world; and secure incredible profits for imperial capital, thereby compensating the expenditures for the "help" and other concessions to the developing countries.

Let us recall that Iran under the shah spent -- according to official data -- more than 19.5 billion dollars during the period 1972-1978 for military purposes (after the overthrow of the monarchy many agreements for the military cooperation with the United States were annulled). From 1975 to 1978 Saudi Arabia placed military orders worth 15 billion dollars. During the last years, Egypt has received American military equipment and supplies worth about 5 billion dollars. During the period 1974 - 1978 alone, the United States sold the developing countries -- based on available data -- weapons worth more than 100 billion dollars (in 1978 prices). The lion's share of these sales -- more than 70 percent -- came to the United States. As Western specialists themselves admit, "by controlling the delivery of Western arms and the training of personnel and by providing other analogous services, the United States can and must keep the military potential of the less developed countries under its control."²

The drawing of the liberated states into the arms race involves a whole series of negative consequences for the development of their economies. Thus, the report of UN experts in this connection says: "... the arms race contributes to the preservation and aggravation of the rupture between developed and developing countries and the one within these groups. It prevents cooperation between states, social economic progress in general, and the establishment of a new international economic order."

Today, V. I. Lenin's words that the propagandists of the myth of "Red militarism" only "pretend that they believe in this stupidity, and fill their ammunition left and right, using for this purpose their barrister ability to compose false arguments and blind the eyes of the masses with light".⁴ Indeed, it is difficult to assume that Western state and political circles, for example, the president of the United States and his assistants, seriously believe in the "Soviet threat". The matter here lies in something else, in the poorly concealed striving to give, -- as Z. Brzezinski admits -- to the world, which has been seized by profound and rapid political changes, an appearance which "would correspond to our (that is, American -- Ye.P.) interests and which would be responsive to our values."⁵

What "interests" and "values" does the United States have in mind with respect to Africa? There exist authoritative explanations on UN questions also. An American Institute for social and political research recently

published a collection of articles by extremely prominent U.S. military figures entitled "Military Strategy for the 1980's." In one of them from the pen of army general M. Taylor, a former U. S. army chief of staff and chairman of the president's advisory council on intelligence activities, abroad, an answer is given to the question of why the revolutionary events in Africa are fraught with "trouble" for Washington and are a "warning" to it. The American general writes in plain terms: "Our understanding of the complexities of African problems is combined with an ever higher appraisal of the economic importance of this region's natural resources in the future" A little later he adds: "... having mentioned our interest in the natural resources of Africa, we thereby draw attention to one of the most important new factors determining our military might -- the growing national dependence on imports." Later M. Taylor, citing the need to preserve the "American way of life" and the exhaustion of the country's own natural resources, considers that the United States "in spite of everything" must secure for itself a "never-ending stream" of raw materials from the developing countries. Among these parts of the world which are the "greatest interest" to the United States, he mentions the Near East, Africa south of the Sahara, and southeast Asia.

Here, everything is in its place. The problem of how to preserve the free access of American monopolies to the useful minerals of Africa starts the representative of the U. S. military-industrial complex. He himself lists the main ones. They are all, chromite, bauxite, manganese, nickel, lead, zinc, etc. Thus the source is the liberation struggle of the continent's people. Behind the evolution of such plans, the attempt to undermine its whitewash fervor, despite the USSR support of national liberation movements as a "manifestation of Soviet expansionism", set some African states against others, and undermine the anti-imperialist solidarity of the continent's countries, spring from this.

American officials do not speak any less openly on this matter than the retired generals. Paul R. Mus, assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs unequivocally gave one to understand during his recent visit to General that under "the interests of the African countries, Washington understands 'regional stability' which in its turn is interpreted as a situation responsive to 'the ideals of western freedom.'" It seems that nothing other than the lawful striving of the majority of the liberated countries to strengthen and develop relations of equal cooperation with the world of socialism disrupts this "stability." Regarding these countries, the position of imperialist circles is adopting an ever more open nature: "If they demonstrate independence from Moscow and a readiness to promote overall regional stability, we must encourage them. If not -- we must isolate them."² This is what Z. Brzezinski says, not troubling to attempt to camouflage the spirit of militant hegemonism and complete disregard for the sovereignty of the young states which flows from such words.

Thus, imperialism feeds anti-Soviet hysteria in order to attempt to broaden the sphere of its capitalism in the developing world as its troubled wave, preserve and intensify the exploitation of the young countries' national riches, and use their territory as a strategic spring-board against the world of socialism and national liberation forces.

This plan is seen most clearly in President J. Carter's last "State of the Union" message (January 1981) to the U.S. Congress. He proclaimed: "Africa will acquire ever more important significance for us because of -- economic, political and strategic reasons, we must strengthen our ties -- which are based on mutual interest -- with the African continent. We ... will help the Africans to solve their political problems and maintain stability on their continent." The question immediately arises: Do the Africans need the help of the United States in solving their political problems? Or is this already the sole prerogative of Washington? The phrase of the "vital interests" J. Carter later explains what methods the American administration plans to use: "We will also provide to friendly countries -- be they on the Horn of Africa or in other areas of that continent -- help in ensuring their security, in those cases where it is required for the defense of their borders." The prospects for direct U.S. military intervention in the affairs of the African states, and for organizing provocations and enkindling conflicts loom plainly behind these words, and more so since it is well known which countries Washington regards in the category of "friendly" and which it does not.

Such is the real state of affairs in the imperialist propaganda being spread about the myth of the "Soviet threat" in Africa and its official purpose.

II

The national liberation movement -- this is an inseparable part of the world's revolutionary renovation process. Of course, any liberation struggle only arises on national grounds. It is impossible to create a revolutionary situation artificially; it cannot be an "export" item. This is the position of Marxist-Leninist teachings and of scientific socialism on these matters. If bourgeois propaganda and many Western political and state figures continue to explain the upsurge in the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa as an "export of revolution" and to boil the growth of the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology on the continent down to "Soviet intrigues", then their striving to falsify the facts of the actual reality is graphically apparent.

What are the reasons for the profound social improvements -- which are occurring here during the present stage? In what directions are they going?

Let us begin with the main thing -- the selection of a socialist orientation by a number of countries in Africa. Any impartial analysis shows that this selection is caused by deep internal reasons. It is a justified reaction to capitalism's inability to provide a solution for the very acute social and economic problems which have been inherited from the colonial past.

For example, the conclusion of K. Malla, head of the economics department of Dar es Salaam University that "after the Second World War, not a single young country, acting according to capitalist prescriptions, achieved progress in its development -- in the broad sense, that is, in the plan for overcoming mass poverty, disease and illiteracy".⁸ The participants in the 3rd session of the Organization of African Unity council of ministers which was held in Monrovia (Liberia) in July 1979 also came to a similar conclusion. The session adopted a special document called the "Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa." It says in it that the past 20 years have been years of economic failures and if the existing "developmental models" are not changed, then 60 percent of the continent's population (450 million people) will be illiterate by the year 2000, that is, their number will exceed the total population of Africa in 1960, and the production of the necessary food will decrease by 30 percent.⁹

Thus, an ever larger number of sober thinking Africans are being won over to the fact that the solution of the key social and economic problems of the continent's countries is only possible by non-capitalist development. The president of Tanzania, J. Nyerere, did not speak about the fact that only the socialist option can lead African countries out of poverty and backwardness¹⁰ nor did the president of the Guinean republic, A. Sekou Toure, emphasize that the "Guineans have selected a non-capitalist developmental system -- since they have refused to allow the exploitation of man by man and perpetuate social inequality between people"¹¹ -- at "Moscow's prompting."

A very important feature of the modern stage of the national liberation movement in Africa is the growing striving of the people to be masters in their own house, rid themselves of the dominance of foreign monopolies, and establish complete control over their national natural resources. This struggle has an anti-imperialist trend and it seriously weakens the position of monopoly capital. Neocolonialists perceive the threat to their interests not so much in the cases themselves of nationalization of this or that enterprise, especially in the extractive industry, as in their possible consequences. What will happen later? Will the African countries not begin an expanded diversification of their foreign economic ties?

The possible answers to these questions scare imperialist circles. The attempts of their representatives to portray the striving of the continent's young states to rid themselves of the dominance of foreign monopolies as the result of "aggression from without" or of foreign instigation, flows from this. Thus, M. Taylor, who was mentioned above, maintains that the "preservation of access to markets in the Near East and in Africa south of the Sahara is linked with serious problems because of the conduct of the Soviet Union and local conditions...."¹² Concerning "local conditions", the general seemingly is right. Indeed, the continent's independent countries want to change a situation where, for example, American monopolies alone managed to extract from Africa (less the Republic of South Africa) during the period 1950-1978 profits totalling eight billion dollars. This exceeds almost sevenfold the flow of their new capital investments. The developing

countries are trying to eliminate the conditions which contribute to the growth of their foreign debts whose volume reached almost 300 billion dollars by 1976. In this regard, expenditures on their repayment exceed 25 percent of their export revenue.¹³ More than 40 billion of this total falls on the African countries.

During recent years, the wave of nationalization is embracing the independent part of the continent on an ever wider basis. The share of nationalized foreign capital in Africa has grown from 50-51 percent to 70-80 percent, and in individual countries -- for example, in Algeria and Nigeria -- foreign enterprises have been completely transformed into state property.¹⁴ Incidentally, the Nigerian government did not by any means nationalize the enterprises belonging to British Petroleum, in August 1979 on the "recommendation" of the Soviet Union, but as a sign of protest against the policy of imperialism in South Africa. The USSR also was not the co-author of the Monrovia Declaration which was adopted by the 16th session of the assembly of all of state and governments of the member countries of the Organization of African Unity in July 1979. In it, it says that the countries of Africa will cooperate in the field of controlling the exploitation of natural resources, and their extraction and use in developing the economy.¹⁵ The Declaration of the 6th Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Havana, September 1979) -- of the 90 participants, 49 were African states -- also said that "the conference once again emphasizes the inalienable right of developing countries -- producers of raw materials -- to exercise complete, continuous and effective sovereignty over their natural riches, especially in connection with such questions as the methods for exploiting them, managing them, and establishing prices and markets."

The liberation struggle in Africa is developing in two basic directions.

First, there are the progressive changes within a whole number of countries. Among them are the victory of national liberation forces in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Benin; the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in a number of states; the approaching break-up of racist rule in the southern part of the continent whose approach is testified to by the victory of the patriotic forces of Zimbabwe in the general parliamentary elections; and the creation in an ever larger number of the continent's states of vanguard revolutionary democratic parties which are guided in their activities by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. In many countries, the state sector is beginning to play a leading role in the development of industry, eliminating feudal landownership, introducing progressive agrarian reforms, waging a broad offensive against the illiteracy, poverty and disease which have been inherited from the recent colonial past. Of course, these improvements are not taking place smoothly: they are accompanied by delimitations of social forces and the intensification of the class struggle.

The second direction is the struggle of the young states for economic liberation, the struggle against the rule of monopoly capital in the system of world economic ties, and the struggle for the elimination of their unequal status in international economic relations. By combining their forces, they

are achieving in the world arena a complete solution to the problems of producing and marketing their native raw materials, obtaining technology, regulating financial commitments, foreign trade, industrialization, developing agriculture, limiting the activities of transnational monopolies, etc. As is known, all these requirements are included in the program of the new international order for the establishment of which the African states have come out in favor along with the developing countries of Asia and Latin America.

And so, the intensification of the liberation struggle in Africa is not the result of an "export of communism" -- as the ideologists of neocolonialism are trying to portray it -- but the result of the strivings of the young states to rid themselves of imperialism's domination, achieve economic independence, and enter on to the wide road of social progress.

III

The principles of internationalism and solidarity with people fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism and for peace, democracy and social progress are the basis of the USSR's foreign policy course. These principles are fixed in the Constitution of the USSR where, when listing the goals of Soviet foreign policy it is pointed out that it is directed at supporting the people's struggle for national liberation and social progress. In Africa, just as everywhere else, the Soviet Union is coming forward on the side of forces taking anti-imperialist positions, and is consistently implementing the Leninist idea of an alliance of world socialism and national liberation.

The cooperation of the USSR with the young states is aimed at making it easier for people, who have thrown off the colonial yoke, to solve the very complicated tasks which face them. Such a policy is a completely new phenomenon in the system of modern international relations. The strength of the Soviet Union's foreign policy course consists of the fact that being based on the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, equality in international relations, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other peoples, it is responsive to the interests of the liberated countries which have entered on the path to independent national development. The USSR invariably renders disinterested aid and assistance to these countries. In the political field, it is assistance to strengthen the independence of the young states and the political and diplomatic defense of their interests in the world arena and in international organizations; in the economic sphere, it is comprehensive aid in creating a national economy, in opposing neocolonial dictation and blackmail, in maintaining the complete sovereignty of the liberated countries over their natural riches, and in their struggling to eliminate the inequality in the international division of labor; in the field of science and culture, it is assistance in the training of technical and scientific personnel, in the development of a national art and literature by encouraging the exchange of cultural valuables. Finally, in the military sphere, our country is offering the young states aid in strengthening their

defensive capabilities so that they can repulse any aggression and resist military pressure by the imperialist powers and their accomplices.

All that we talked about above -- be it the political, economic, scientific-technical, or other aspects of the relations of the Soviet Union and other socialist states with the liberated countries of Africa--are not empty declarations but a highly principled policy which is being constantly embodied in practice. Let us turn to some actual cases.

First, it is necessary to remember that on the initiative of the USSR, the UN adopted in 1960 the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in 1963 -- the Declaration on Eliminating All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in 1973 -- the Declaration Condemning Apartheid. During the 28th and 29th special and the 29th and subsequent scheduled sessions of the General Assembly and during the 4th and 5th UNCTAD sessions, the Soviet Union resolutely supported the just demands of the developing countries, including the African countries, for the elimination of protectionist barriers in world trade, the establishment of control over the activities of multinational corporations, and a cardinal reorganization of international economic relations.

The economic cooperation of the USSR with the young states of Africa--assistance of every kind to their economic development -- is based on these same principles. One of the basic forms of the USSR's economic cooperation with the continent's countries is trade. The turnover in Soviet-African trade is continuously increasing. In this regard, almost 90 percent of Soviet exports are goods of industrial significance. In its turn, the USSR receives from Africa not only goods which Africa traditionally exports but also--and it is important to note this -- finished industrial items produced locally. This, in turn, undoubtedly, contributes to the expansion and stabilization of a market for the sale of the young states' products.

The Soviet Union is rendering considerable aid to African countries in the training of national personnel. With its assistance more than 100 different training institutions have been created and equipped. About 15000 there are higher schools. The number of African students studying in our country is more than 7,000. The USSR annually allots 3,000 scholarships for citizens of the African countries.

Concerning the contribution of the USSR to the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of a number of African countries so that they can parry the foreign interventions provoked by the neocolonial circles against them, this policy flows directly from the highly principled foreign policy course of the Soviet state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. L. I. Brezhnev declared during the 25th CPSU Congress: "Our party is rendering and will render support to people who are fighting for their freedom. In doing this, the Soviet Union is not looking for any benefit for itself, is not hunting for concessions, is not obtaining political dominance, and is not soliciting military bases. We are acting as our revolutionary conscience, as our communist beliefs tell us."

This policy completely corresponds not only to the obligations of the USSR in its international agreements -- which it always observes strictly -- but also to the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Graphic examples of this are the events in Angola and Ethiopia where the fraternal help of the USSR and Cuba wrecked the plans of the aggressors and forced them to retreat. Let us dwell on these events in more detail; let us look at why they evoked the usual outburst of anti-Soviet hysteria in the United States and China.

In 1975, the many-year struggle of the Angolan people, headed by the organization of the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), against the Portuguese colonialists was crowned with success. The People's Republic of Angola was declared. Right after this, the dissident groupings, FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] -- headed by the imperialist henchmen, Kh. Roberto and Zh. Savimbi -- shifted to open military actions against the young republic with the financial, military and other support of the United States, the Republic of South Africa, and Beijing. Regular units of the Republic of South Africa, mercenary subunits, and Zaire military formations soon joined them.

Under the conditions which had taken shape, the government of Angola was forced to turn to friendly countries with a request for aid. The USSR, which offered the young republic economic and technical help, and Cuba, which sent a battalion of regular troops with antitank weapons to the People's Republic of Angola in order to support the Angolan patriots in their resistance to the invasion of the South African racists, were the first to answer this request. At the time of the arrival of the first Cuban military unit in the country, the interventionists were 25 kilometers from Luanda, and their artillery was shelling the outskirts of the capital. The South African troops had already advanced more than 700 kilometers from the south from the Namibian border.

With the help of the socialist countries, the national liberation army of the People's Republic of Angola checked the advance of the aggressors at the capital, and on 27 March 1976 the last interventionists were driven from Angolan land. A propaganda campaign against the USSR and Cuba which was allegedly being used by the Soviet Union "for its interests" was also unwrapped in the West during this period. This slander was unmasked by F. Castro who pointed out that Cuba's decision to send its armed forces to Angola "is its full responsibility. The USSR... never asked for the dispatch of even a single Cuban to that country. The USSR displays exceptional respect and scrupulousness in its relations with Cuba. A decision of this type can be taken only by our own party."¹⁶

The absurdity of the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban concoctions was also revealed during the Security Council session in March 1976. The inalienable and legitimate right of each state to ask assistance from any other state or group of states when exercising its sovereignty was once again affirmed in a special resolution adopted by it in connection with the examination of

the question of aggression against Angola. The Security Council condemned the Republic of South Africa's aggression and demanded compensation for the people of Angola for the losses inflicted by the war. Nine countries voted for the resolution. The imperialist powers preferred to abstain from voting.

Why did the usual hysteria break out in the United States in connection with the Angolan events? Besides political and military strategic considerations and fears that the victory of the revolution in Angola would spread the liberation struggle wave to the borders of the racist Republic of South Africa which is the ward of the United States, economic factors played no unimportant role. As THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper wrote at the time: "It would be naive to discard Angola from calculations because it is a remote country not having such importance.... We are the largest importers of Angolan goods in the world. We receive half of all the oil extracted from the oil fields of Cabinda.... The Angolan diamond mines of the "Diamang" type are in fifth place in the world. A large portfolio of shares there belongs to the United States.... The First National City Bank and the Chase Manhattan Bank are linked with Angolan banks...."¹⁷

It was not "concern" for the people of Angola that aroused bellicose activities in the United States but the fear of losing its hegemony and control and the opportunity to extort natural riches from there without interference. Picture to yourself for a minute that Angola had not been given the assistance of the socialist countries during this critical period of 1975-1976. What would have been the situation which would have taken shape? Considering the inequality of forces, it is not difficult to imagine that most probably the People's Republic of Angola would have been occupied by the forces of the Republic of South Africa. The racists would have established very brutal terror in the country, trying to break the patriots' resistance. And in the UN Security Council the Western "defenders of human rights" would have made a show of indignation as has already been done for more than ten years with regard to Namibia.

Soviet assistance to the defense of Angola and the presence of Cuban servicemen in the country, who were there at the request of the legitimate government of a sovereign state, were therefore the stabilizing factors. They contributed to the strengthening of independence and to the preservation of the People's Republic of Angola's territorial integrity under conditions where the South African racists are still continuing their aggressive actions against the republic, subjecting the territory of the People's Republic of Angola to aerial bombing, shelling the peaceful population centers with long-range artillery from Namibia which has been occupied by them, and are sending sabotage and subversive groups into the country.

Let us go now to the events on the Horn of Africa. Without going into the history of the Somalia-Ethiopian disagreements which were caused by Somalia's claims to areas of Ethiopia (as well as to parts of the territory of Kenya and Djibouti), let us recall that on 23 July 1977 the Somali leadership unleashed an armed conflict in this area, thereby violating one of the basic

principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity about mandatory respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state, as well as the Charter of the United Nations. This aggressive act combined with the statements of internal reaction in Ethiopia pursued the goal of wrecking the accomplishments of the 1974 national democratic revolution.

The ruling clique of Mogadiscio did not conceal the fact that it enjoyed the support of Arab reaction as well as imperialist states, in particular the United States. Washington and its allies were trying to use the conflict to eliminate the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia and restore its lost positions in this area of the continent. Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran under the shah, and Egypt were used to transport weapons to Somalia. American emissaries were constant visitors to Mogadiscio. The PRC leadership, who came out in defense of Somalia's aggressive actions, also took its usual position.

In this situation, the government of Ethiopia turned to its friends for aid. The Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist states rendered assistance to revolutionary Ethiopia in full accord with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In March 1978, the liberation of all the country's territory was in fact completed.

Again it is necessary to ask the question: What situation would have taken shape in Ethiopia and on the Horn of Africa in general had the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist states not rendered fraternal help under conditions where the aggressors had already seized more than a third of the country's territory, the Eritrean separatists were sharply intensifying military operations, and the subversive acts of internal counterrevolutionaries were becoming stronger? The very existence of socialist Ethiopia would have been threatened, and this would have also involved the complete destabilization of the situation throughout the area.

Thus, just as in 1978 so also at the present time has Soviet and Cuban aid to socialist Ethiopia contributed, and is contributing, to normalizing and bettering the political situation on the Horn of Africa.

The Soviet Union threatens no one in Africa just as it doesn't anywhere else. However, it has never waived and will not waive international principles and solidarity with people struggling against imperialism. L. I. Brezhnev declared in his speech to the voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election district on 22 February 1980: "The USSR has made a noticeable contribution to strengthening the economy, cultural construction, and the defenses of some countries -- and we are proud of this. Faithful to Leninist precepts, we are always on the side of people who are defending their freedom and independence. However, we never use our help as pressure on those to whom it is given."

* * *

The national liberation struggle of the people of Africa is gathering strength and entering a new stage. Concerning the myths of the "Soviet threat" in Africa and the USSR's "interference" in the internal affairs of the young states, such fictions are refuted by reality itself. The continent's progressive forces are fully aware of the fact that such myths are artificially created by those who need a pretext for broadening their expansion, for using the territory of the liberated countries as a springboard for the struggle against the world of socialism and national liberation movements, and for preserving the neocolonial system of robbing and exploiting people who are throwing off the colonial yoke.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more details on the modern neocolonial strategy, cf. K. Brutents, "Neocolonialism on the Threshold of the 1980's": A 'Modernization' of Strategy", *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENiya*, Nos 6 and 7, 1979.
2. S. Lyndenbergh, "Weapons for the World Update. U.S. Corporate Role in International Arms Transfers," New York, 1977, pp 11 and 12.
3. "Economic and Social Consequence of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, Update Report of Secretary-General, United Nations". New York, 1978 (A/32/88/Rev. 1), p 59.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch" [Complete Collection of Works], Vol 38, p. 50.
5. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, Spring, 1979, p 766.
6. "Grand Strategy for the 1980's", ed by B. Palmer, Jr. Washington, 1978, p 4.
7. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, Spring, 1979, p 766.
8. Quoted in *PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALISM*, No 5, 1978, p 35.
9. OAU document, CM. Res. 722 (XXXI), Rev. 1.
10. Quoted in F. Manchukha, "Aktual'nyye problemy sovremennoy Afriki" [Urgent Problems of Modern Africa], Moscow, 1979, p. 10.
11. Ahmed Sekou Toure, "L'Afrique et la Revolution," Vol. 13, Conakry, 1966, p 342.
12. "Grand Strategy for the 1980's", p 14.
13. UNCTAD document V. TD/224, 8 March 1979, p 4.

14. Cf. R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, "Sovremennyye Problemy Azii i Afriki" [Modern Problems of Asia and Africa], Moscow, 1978, p 220.
15. "Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government", Monrovia, Liberia, 17 - 20 July 1979, AHG/ST (XVI), Rev. 1, p 3.
16. F. Castro, "Angola-African Khiron", Havana, 1976, p 29.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 February 1976.

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INTERNATIONAL

NICARAGUA VIEWED ONE YEAR AFTER REVOLUTION

Postrevolutionary Development of Nicaragua

Moscow. LITNISKAYA AMERIKA In Russian No 7, Jul 80 signed to press. (1 Jun 80)
p. 14-15

Article by M. I. Chumakova: "On the Difficult Path of National Rebirth"
(note: renumbered)

Excerpt: A year ago, on 19 July 1979, after the overthrow of Somoza, Nicaragua began a stage of revolutionary-democratic changes. The creation and strengthening of the new state, the rebuilding of the devastated economy, the return of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans to peaceful productive labor, and the necessity of settling very acute social conflicts—this was the range of problems which the Sandinists encountered after winning political power. These problems had to be solved immediately, in a difficult domestic political situation and under the conditions of an complicating of the international situation.

The Main Task--Rebuilding the Economy

Regular power inherited from the dictatorship a distorted economic structure, enormous external indebtedness, destroyed industrial enterprises and infrastructure, and abandoned agricultural lands.¹

The implementation of the program of the Junta of the Government of national Reconstruction of Nicaragua started immediately after the victory of the revolution. On the basis of governmental decrees, the property of the Somoza clan was confiscated and turned over to the state, the private banks and insurance companies were nationalized, a state monopoly of foreign trade was introduced, the ore-mining industry was nationalized, and an agrarian reform was commenced. The economic policy of the Sandinist Government during the stage of reconstruction was aimed at creating a mixed economy, and primary attention was given to strengthening the state and public sector or the public ownership sphere.

In December 1979, an emergency plan was approved for the reconstruction of the economy, for the good of the people.

In order to obtain the necessary financial means for rebuilding the nation, the Sandinist leadership developed an extensive international campaign. By the end of February 1980, the government already possessed 490 million dollars in the form of loans and credits (at a rate of 4.5 percent per annum, with a deferment on repayment for 10 years and a repayment period up to 35 years), and 47 million dollars in the form of food assistance. Along with this, it carried out measures to mobilize the internal financial resources. A one-shot 6 percent tax on property over 10,000 dollars was introduced, and in April 1980 a decision was taken to impose a 40 percent income tax above 200,000 dollars a year. In endeavoring to prevent the flight of capital out of the country, the junta promulgated a law which prevented foreign and local entrepreneurs from transferring capital over-

For the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the industrial reconstruction process, in January 1980, the National Council for the Questions of Industrial Policy was organized. Simultaneously measures began to be carried out to involve the workers in managing production through the trade unions and the mass public organizations.

The carrying out of an agrarian reform became one of the leading areas of socioeconomic policy for the government. As a result of confiscating the landholdings of Somoza and his supporters, 18.5 million hectares of fertile lands became state property. These lands are now under the control of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (NARI) which is the agency carrying out the policy of the Sandinist leadership in the countryside. The NARI and its eight regional divisions are taking efforts to create state farms, to encourage and stimulate various forms of cooperatives and popular people's communes, and to eradicate the vestiges of feudal relations.

The Policy of Social Changes

Simultaneously with the reconstruction of the economy, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries began to resolve very acute social problems such as unemployment, illiteracy and poverty, the shortage of housing and food, and the absence of medical aid.

The Sandinists called 1980 the year of eradicating illiteracy. There are two organizations of volunteers involved in the nationwide campaign, the People's Teachers and the People's Army for the Eradication of Illiteracy (PAEI). Nicaragua is being given effective help in this area by Cuba. There are 1,200 Cuban teachers in the country and they have begun to teach over 30,000 junior grade students. With Cuban assistance, 558 schools have been opened in Nicaragua, and 65 school buildings have been repaired. In the very first months after the victory of the revolution, over 500 Nicaraguan young men and women arrived at Juventud Island, and they began to study in the Carlos Fonseca Amador Educational and Labor School.

The nationwide campaign to eradicate illiteracy has become the start of a cultural revolution and a powerful means of ideological and political influence on the masses.

The combating of unemployment is another area in the social policy of the Sandinist leadership. The emergency plan provides for a reduction of the unemployment level from 28 to 17 percent. In the aim of increasing the number of jobs (by 95,000 in 1980), an extensive public works program is being carried out (the construction of roads, parks and hospitals). Permanent employment is being provided on the state farms which are being set up on confiscated lands. In December 1975, a decree was passed on the founding of the Special Fund Against Unemployment. In accord with this decree, the thirteenth wage payment is limited to 1,500 cordobas, and amounts exceeding this maximum go to the unemployment elimination fund.

In close cooperation with the mass organizations, the Sandinist leadership is solving the housing problem (the nation lacks 300,000 apartments and of the 500,000 existing ones, 60 percent do not meet the sanitary standards). Housing brigades are being organized under the Sandinist defense committees (DDC), and these brigades are engaged in the reconstruction and repair of housing, and the practice of individual construction is encouraged.

A program for improving public health has begun to be carried out, and measures are being taken for the mass vaccinating of the population and for broadening the network of medical facilities. Here the Nicaraguans are being aided by 400 Cuban physicians.

An important aspect of the social policy of the new power has been the involving of the 170,000 Indians living in the regions of the Atlantic coast of the country in the process of national reconstruction. The organ of the SNLF (Sandinist National Liberation Front), the newspaper "EL CAÑA" is being published in the Miskitu language which has become the second official language of the nation. The Sandinist Indigene Union has become the body carrying out the government's policy on the Indian question.

The Shaping of the Revolutionary State

The Sandinist leadership has been aware that it is impossible to carry out fundamental changes in the country without achieving political stability. For this reason one of the most important areas of its policy has been to strengthen the revolutionary state and establish the bases of the new political system. During the very first months, the Sandinists began to create bodies of popular power, to replace the state apparatus, and to organize a revolutionary army and the bodies of state security and the police. The undertaken structural reorganization of the SNLF leadership was aimed at giving greater effectiveness to its activities.

Confronted with the unceasing attempts of the domestic and foreign reaction to impede the process of change, the Sandinists have paid particular attention to the creation and strengthening of the national armed forces.

which would defend the victories of the revolution and guarantee the sovereignty of the nation. The Military Committee of the National SNLF leadership is carrying out difficult work in transforming the rebel detachments into the regular Sandinist People's Army. The first steps have been taken to set up a national school for training military personnel; hundreds of Sandinist fighters have been trained at accelerated courses. Confronted by the unceasing provocations of the counterrevolutionary forces, the Sandinist leadership has undertaken a number of measures to supply the army with the necessary equipment and supplies and to strengthen the defense potential of the nation.

An important step in strengthening revolutionary order and ties with the masses was the creation of the Sandinist people's police which was formed on a volunteer basis in February 1980.

The loyalty to the ideals of revolution, to true democracy and social justice, the honesty and self-sacrifice which mark the Sandinist leaders are particularly apparent in their daily work to observe revolutionary legality and in their desire not to permit violent retribution against their former enemies.

The difficult tasks of national reconstruction, the deepening of the process of change and the strengthening of the people's victories have brought to the forefront the problem of party organization and the turning of the Sandinist Front into a revolutionary party on the basis of the political, historical and military experience of Sandinism enriched by the lessons of the world revolutionary movement. The Sandinist leaders consider the creation of a party to be an essential condition for the organized strengthening of the Sandinist ranks, for successfully overcoming the difficulties of the reconstruction period and for carrying out a uniform political course. In all the 16 departments of the country, SNLF governing committees have been organized and have begun functioning. Ideological work is being carried out to indoctrinate the Nicaraguans in a spirit of internationalism, and the anti-imperialist views of Sandino, the democratic and egalitarian principles and ethical concepts of Che Guevara are being popularized.

In understanding the necessity of maintaining and strengthening the unity of the revolutionary vanguard, the Sandinist leadership has also made significant efforts to strengthen the unity of all the democratic and anti-imperialist forces contributing to the victory of the national liberation stage of the revolution. In March 1980, after a number of meetings with the representatives of various political parties under the leadership and with the active involvement of the SNLF, the Patriotic Front was created. The creation of the Patriotic Front embodies the idea of maintaining the unity of the democratic organizations which is particularly important under conditions where symptoms of polarization among the diverse social and political forces are appearing.

In consistently carrying out a policy of democratizing social life, the Sandinistas have provided an opportunity for the activities of groups and organizations of diverse ideological and political hues, if they are not of an antipopular, counterrevolutionary nature. However, certain former allies of the Sandinistas, the Worker Front group with its paramilitary MILPAS formations, and the so-called Communist Party of Nicaragua headed by Ali Altamirano, in arbitrarily interpreting the principle of freedom of political activities, have actually assumed a hostile position vis-a-vis revolutionary power.

Even during the first months after the victory of the revolution, these groupings endeavored to "correct" the situation, proceeding from their narrow sectarian, anarchist and syndicalist views, and to "accelerate" the development of the revolutionary process. They came out against the Program of National Reconstruction and the policy of the government of national reconstruction, without recognizing the popular nature of the Nicaraguan revolution. In March 1980, weapons caches and plans for further actions by the Worker Front to seize enterprises were found. In the course of the investigation, ties were discovered between the Altamirano group and the Worker Front. A plan existed for joint operations, and the leaders of these groups established contacts with representatives of the CIA. Thus, in their adventurist activities to destabilize the domestic political situation, these Trotskyite and Maoist groupings ended up in the same team with the forces of counterrevolution and imperialism.

Along with the antipopular actions of the former allies of the Sandinistas, in the nation one can observe a rise in the activities of the ultrarightist terrorist groups of Somoza followers who murdered soldiers of the Sandinist People's Army, coworkers of the NARI and the leaders of progressive political parties. Thousands of Somoza followers found haven in neighboring countries and did not abandon their plans for counterrevolutionary revenge.

The main areas of collision between the revolutionary and conservative forces have been over the questions of the government's economic policy, the holding of elections and the conditions for the activities of political parties and trade unions. The conservative forces consisting of bourgeois politicians, landowners and entrepreneurs have demanded guarantees and precise criteria for the activities of the private sector, and have expressed growing fears over the start of agrarian reform, viewing the radical changes as a threat to their interests and fearing for the political future of the country.

On 27 April 1980, the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction approved a decree on the State Council, according to which its membership is to be increased from 33 to 47 persons.

The State Council which was formed at the beginning of May possesses the powers to promulgate draft laws and amendments to laws which are approved by the initiative of executive power.

Such membership of the council has clearly not been to the liking of a portion of the entrepreneur circles and bourgeois politicians who viewed the government's decision as the collapsing of hopes to create the institutions of a "traditional" bourgeois parliamentarianism and an infringement of their political rights. These circles have attempted a counteroffensive against the position of the Sandinists, in attacking the government and accusing it of establishing a "totalitarian regime" and deviating from the program.

In an acute and difficult political struggle which has accompanied the breaking of the archaic socioeconomic structure and the establishing of the new government, in surmounting the resistance of all sorts of counter-revolutionaries, the Sandinists have steadfastly progressed in their revolutionary-democratic changes, making each Nicaraguan aware of the purpose of the government's measures and the truth about the difficulties and successes in the process of national reconstruction.

The concentrating of political power in the hands of the Sandinists, the strengthening of the popular state, the creation of a state sector in the economy, the beginnings of a social and cultural revolution, the previously unprecedented scope of mobilizing the masses and the growth of their political awareness--all of this shows the strength of the victories of the revolutionary process.

The policy of the Sandinist leadership aimed at carrying out the emergency plan for the reconstruction of the economy is based upon the support of the broad masses, on the aid and cooperation of many countries of the world, and on the factor of international solidarity.

Strengthening Independence and Developing Cooperation

In the national-liberation stage of the revolution, in the difficult years of fighting against the dictatorship, of important significance were the international solidarity with the Nicaraguan people and the political actions of governments and social organizations which condemned the criminal Somoza regime and provided material and moral support for the SNLF. In many Latin American and Western European countries, the Sandinists were able to create, in the words of U. Ortega, "their own sort of solidarity infrastructure."¹ The SNLF carried out a mature, creative and effective policy, in popularizing the basic provisions of its program and emphasizing its democratic nature.

In the new, revolutionary-democratic stage of the Nicaraguan revolution, the role of international solidarity has further increased. For carrying out the tasks of national reconstruction in the wounded and devastated country, emergency external financial support was required. During the first months after the victory of the revolution, free aid was received from the governments and social organizations of many countries of the world.

Along with the factor of international solidarity, the active foreign policy of the government of national reconstruction began to be of the greatest significance for strengthening the positions of the new power. The establishing and strengthening of an independent course occurred in a difficult domestic political and international situation. The new foreign policy arose simultaneously with the changes in the socioeconomic and political life of Nicaraguan society.

The Program of the Junta emphasized that the policy conducted by it on the international scene would be based upon the principles of independence and nonalignment and the development of ties with all states "which respect the right of self-determination and a just, mutually-advantageous nature of economic relations" and which show "respect for the domestic revolutionary process in Nicaragua."

These provisions of the program were emphasized in the statements of the members of the junta who pointed out that the main trait in Nicaraguan foreign policy would be an active anti-imperialist policy.

During the first months of the existence of the new government, the basic directions of foreign policy activities were defined, and a policy was set of maintaining broad international ties. Particular importance was given to strengthening relations with the nonaligned and socialist countries.

Thus, a radical reorientation in the country's international policy occurred in the aim of strengthening independence and sovereignty. In contrast to the reactionary course of the dictatorial regime, the Sandinist leadership began to establish broad international ties, following the line of developing all-round cooperation with the progressive regimes in Latin America, with the developing countries of Asia and Africa, and with the states of the socialist commonwealth, at the same time giving important significance to establishing relations with the developed capitalist countries.

In the range of relations with the developing countries, ties with the progressive states have assumed the most diverse character. One month after the victory of the revolution, Managua was visited by the commander-in-chief of the Panamanian National Guard, Gen O. Torrijos, and in December 1979, a Nicaraguan governmental delegation consisting of Tomás Borge and Bellande Arce traveled to Panama. The talks concerned the questions of developing bilateral ties and the situation in Central America.⁵ Relations with Jamaica and Grenada began to develop beneficially. In March 1980, a delegation headed by the junta member D. Ortega was present at the celebrations for the first anniversary of the revolution in Grenada.

In following a policy of collaboration with the countries and peoples fighting for their liberation, the Sandinist leadership strengthened its lengthy ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and undertook steps to develop relations with the African states. In April 1980, the Nicaraguan government sent its ambassador to Mozambique. In the same month a

Nicaraguan delegation headed by D. Ortega, for the purpose of strengthening friendly ties, visited Angola, Algeria, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. This trip helped to establish cooperation with the progressive African states.

Nicaraguan-Mexican relations have assumed an important place in the relations with Latin American countries. The Sandinists had high praise for the diplomatic and material support from Mexico provided to them during the last months of the struggle against the dictatorship.

The visit in January 1980 by the Mexican president Lopez Portillo to Nicaragua contributed to the further development of international relations. Having arrived in Managua, L. Portillo affirmed the intention of his government to continue to provide Nicaragua with aid without any conditions to be imposed. In the course of the talks common views were established on a number of international problems and questions of regional cooperation. Agreement was reached on periodic consultations on political problems. As a result of the talks, a number of agreements were signed concerned with various spheres of financial-economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation.

In April 1980, the president of Venezuela L. Herrera Campins visited the capital of Nicaragua. The Venezuelan government, immediately after the victory of the revolution, provided significant economic aid and promised to supply Nicaragua with oil.

Following the example of Mexico and Venezuela, the governments of Brazil and Argentina granted Nicaragua credits to purchase equipment and food. Thus, Nicaragua has established broad economic ties with the most influential countries of the continent.

At the same time, serious difficulties also arose on the path of developing international ties with the Latin American countries. At the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, Nicaraguan relations with Colombia took a turn for the worse, after the government of national reconstruction had announced that a number of islands in the Caribbean (San Andres, Providencia, Roncador, Quita Sueño and Serrana) were within the 200-mile limit of the country. This decision caused a sharp response by Colombia which recalled its ambassador from Managua and began to increase its military potential on the disputed islands. The Sandinist leadership is endeavoring to resolve the conflict situation which has arisen with the help of the International Court in the Hague.

The development of relations with the Central American countries has required particular flexibility on the part of the Sandinist leadership. The government of Costa Rica, after the Sandinists came to power, experienced growing fears and showed concern about the policy of the government of national reconstruction. Nicaraguan-Honduran relations were aggravated by the presence of several thousand Somoza followers on Honduras territory and by border incidents. The exacerbation of the domestic political situation

in El Salvador and the increasing struggle by the patriotic forces evoked attacks from the Central American reaction on the Sandinist leadership, accusing them of "exporting the revolution." At the same time, there were no grounds for such assertions, and as a result this propaganda campaign petered out. Sandinist diplomacy, in carrying out its policy vis-a-vis the Central American states, has endeavored to follow a differentiated approach to each of the countries in the subregion and not to fall prey to the intrigues of the reaction. Such a policy has brought good results. At a foreign ministers conference of the Central American countries and Panama in March 1980, a decision was taken to support the Nicaraguan government on the question of deferring debt repayment, a question of vitally important significance for rebuilding the nation's economy.

In the Latin American region, Nicaraguan cooperation with the Republic of Cuba is developing most fruitfully. Socialist Cuba is providing fraternal aid in rebuilding the country and in solving immediate economic and social problems.

In the very first year, the Sandinist leadership succeeded in significantly activating relations with the Latin American states not only on a bilateral but also on a multilateral basis, using the mechanism of regional organizations for obtaining the aid essential in the process of reconstructing the republic and broadening cooperation with the countries of the continent.

The strengthening of Nicaraguan cooperation with Latin America and the influence of the Nicaraguan revolution on the political situation in Central America have become a matter of close attention for the U.S. government agents, a subject of debate in Congress and numerous commentaries in the American press.

The present state of Nicaraguan-American relations is influenced by the lamentable history of the years of U.S. aid to the Somoza plan and the shameful policy of the Carter Administration which right up until July 1979 continued to maintain contacts with the dictatorship, failing to recognize the monstrous discrepancy between the "human rights" policy and the practice of maintaining a criminal regime guilty of acts of genocide.

After a reluctant recognition of the new government, the Carter Administration endeavored to demonstrate its desire to establish contacts and institute good-neighbor relations with Nicaragua.⁶ During the first 2½ months after the victory of the revolution, aid was provided totaling 23.5 million dollars, and there were more frequent trips by American statesmen to Managua and invitations to Nicaraguan entrepreneurs and politicians to visit the United States. At the end of February 1980, after long hesitation, Congress ratified the granting of aid to Nicaragua totaling 75 million dollars, but the Carter Administration imposed such demands on this loan that the carrying out of these would have meant the abandoning of independence in conducting a domestic and foreign policy. The position of the junta which rejected any conditions in obtaining American or any other aid was the qualitatively new, independent foreign policy of Nicaragua.

The Sandinist leadership has made significant efforts to establish relations with the Western European countries. A decision of the Socialist International to provide economic and financial aid to Nicaragua without any political or ideological conditions has ensured favorable prerequisites for developing ties with the Western European states.

Simultaneously with the establishing of ties with the Western European countries, the Sandinist leadership has begun to develop cooperation with the socialist states. The beginning of Soviet-Nicaraguan ties was marked by the normalization of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Nicaragua (19 October 1979). In January 1980, a group of Soviet experts visited Nicaragua where they studied the possibilities and prospects for bilateral cooperation. A significant point in the process of the development of bilateral ties was the visit by a Nicaraguan governmental and party delegation consisting of M. Hassan, T. Borge, U. Ortega and H. Ruiz to the USSR in March 1980. During talks in Moscow, there was a discussion of the urgent problems of the international situation and the questions of the development of Soviet-Nicaraguan relations and ties between the CPSU and the SNLF. As a result of the talks, a trade agreement was signed as well as other agreements on economic and technical cooperation, cultural and scientific cooperation, airlines, protocols on the deliveries of goods and the establishing of commercial agencies as well as a consular convention.⁷ The signing of these documents represents a solid contractual and legal basis for the further strengthening of cooperation and ensures USSR aid in the process of the national reconstruction of Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguan delegation also visited Bulgaria, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In the course of the talks, agreements were signed on trade, economic and cultural cooperation. Thus, an impetus was provided for developing cooperation with the Eastern European socialist countries.

Over the brief time which has passed since the victory of the revolution, Sandinist diplomacy, loyal to its anti-imperialist position and democratic principles, by active, flexible, creative and diverse actions, has defended the sovereignty of the nation, it has provided the necessary financial and economic aid, and gathered broad international support.

The independent foreign policy of Nicaragua has had a positive influence on the domestic political situation, it is becoming a new factor influencing the state and prospects of inter-American relations, and is strengthening the positions of the anti-imperialist and democratic forces.

The flexible actions and decisions of the Sandinists following the difficult path of building a new society, their socioeconomic course and active diplomacy show the firm step of the Nicaraguan revolution which has become the symbol of hope for the peoples fighting for their liberation.

FOOTNOTES

¹See I. M. Bulychev, "From Anarchy to Rebirth," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 1, 1980.

²One of the first decrees of the new government was to repeal the death penalty in the nation.

³BOHEMIA. Havana, No 52, 1979, p 16.

⁴LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 2, 1980, p 63.

⁵LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL REPORT, No 32, 1979, p 256; LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORT, 7 December 1979, p 72.

⁶AMÉRICA LATINA INFORME SEMANAL, No 10, 1979, p 119.

⁷PRAVDA, 20 March 1980.

⁸COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Latinskaya Amerika", 1980

U.S. Attempts To Influence Events

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 80 signed to press 24 Jun 80 pp 57-66

Article by V. N. Dmitriyev: "Political Maneuvering of the United States"

[Text] The overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and the victory of progressive, democratic forces in this country have been an important turning point in the liberation struggle of the Latin American peoples.

The nature and the tactics of U.S. opposition both to the victorious struggle of the Nicaraguan patriots and to the development of the progressive changes in Nicaragua after the overthrow of the dictatorial regime are of interest from the viewpoint primarily of studying the methods by which American imperialism combats the liberation struggle in the Latin American countries during its new stage. In the present-day situation, when, as the experience of Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan and Nicaragua indicates, the positions of antipopular dictatorial regimes are becoming more and more difficult to defend from outside, when the methods of direct foreign military intervention, subversive actions by the CIA and other intelligence bodies of the imperialist states cause universal condemnation and a decisive rebuff, the United States and the other imperialist states must more often resort to more flexible forms of intervention.

The successful armed struggle of the Nicaraguan people under the leadership of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (SNLF) against the dictatorial Somoza regime confronted the Carter Administration with the danger of the loss by the United States of its political, economic and military positions

in this strategically important Central American country. Particular concern was caused by the growing influence of the SNLF as the American ruling circles linked its coming to power with the possibility of turning Nicaragua into a "second Cuba." Even if things did not go this far, American observers felt, "a dictatorship of the leftist sort...possibly would prevent American participation in the economy (of Nicaragua...V.D.). It could even confiscate the already-existing capital investments."¹

The basic tasks of American diplomacy during the entire armed struggle in Nicaragua were: in the first place, to prevent the armed victory of the Sandinists; secondly, to achieve a "peaceful settlement" with the turning of real power over to the representatives of the bourgeois groupings; thirdly, providing international pressure for the purposes of guaranteeing the development of this country along a "moderate," that is, bourgeois reformist, path.

For the purpose of countering the victory of the Sandinist army, the United States undertook efforts (in the first stage of the rebel struggle, openly, and at the final one, concealed) to provide military aid to the dictatorial regime. In particular, although a decision to halt aid had been taken by the U.S. Congress even in September 1978, actually active direct military support for the dictatorship was provided until February 1979, when as a response to Somoza's refusal to accept the "intermediary settlement plan" proposed by the Americans, the U.S. administration decided to cut off such aid and recall its military mission from Managua. Subsequently, however, the Somoza army continued to receive deliveries of arms and other supplies, as the press stated, by roundabout ways, for example, via Israel and certain other countries, as well as through U.S. military bases in the Panama Canal Zone.

According to data in the American press, mercenaries recruited by Somoza in the United States fought on the side of the tyranny. The CIA collaborated actively with Somoza intelligence, and it endeavored to undermine the unity of the SNLF and its positions, as well as weaken support for it by the Latin American states, and in particular, Costa Rica.²

The United States in every possible way prevented the supply of weapons to the SNLF fighters, in hypocritically urging all countries not to supply weapons to either side. Thus, the U.S. embassy in Tunisia, as the Americans themselves admitted, virtually on the eve of the Sandinist victory took measures to prevent the delivery of weapons and medicines to the patriots.

In parallel with its activities in the military area, the Carter Administration gave particular attention to searching for a political solution to the Nicaraguan situation. The main aim of the United States was to prevent the SNLF from coming to power. The political maneuvering which continued after the overthrow of the Somoza regime, in essence, was unprecedented in U.S. Latin American practices. While in the struggle against the Cuban revolution Washington basically relied on violent measures of a military and economic nature, and vis-a-vis the National Unity government in Chile, on

measurements of economic suppression and subversive activities by the CIA and other departments, the more "flexible" approach to Nicaragua was both a consequence of considering the lessons of the Cuban and Chilean experience as well as a reflection of the new political situation in Latin America and the world as a whole.

In searching for alternative "moderate" forces to the Somoza regime, the American ruling circles placed their basic hopes on the Broad Opposition Front (BOF) which brought together various bourgeois organizations. In operating within the "intermediary mission" set up under the aegis of the OAS in September 1978 and consisting of representatives from the United States, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, Washington put pressure on the bourgeois opposition in the aim of maintaining unchanged the compromised structure of the Somoza dictatorship, and in essence made one concession after another to this regime, also forcing the BOF to follow this line. The given tactics led merely to the discrediting of the bourgeois opposition in Nicaragua and to a further strengthening of the anti-American mood there. As a result, 6 of the 16 organizations participating in the BOF moved over to a new political coalition called the National Patriotic Front which was an association of a "pro-Sandinist nature."³ The rejection by Somoza of the "final" U.S. plan for holding a plebiscite repudiated, including in the ranks of the bourgeois opposition, the very idea of the advisability of talks with the dictatorial regime, and further emphasized the significance of armed struggle as the sole means of overthrowing the dictatorship.

In endeavoring in every possible way to compromise the truly national-patriotic nature of the struggle of the Nicaraguan people, the American ruling circles continuously stressed the idea that the struggle against the Somoza regime was the result of the "intrigues of Havana and Moscow," and that the rebel leaders had supposedly been trained in Cuba. To this the member of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, S. Ramirez replied: "As I understand it, President Carter is being told that three (out of five.--V.D.) members of the junta received military training and education in Cuba. In actuality, three members of the junta were educated in the United States."⁴

As the revolutionary process developed in Nicaragua, official Washington became more and more convinced that the further retaining of power by Somoza ran contrary to American long-range interests. As was stated in the U.S. Congress by the chairman of the Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, E. Zorinsky, "the longer Somoza remains in power, the greater the risk of an extremist outcome, and the more political polarization in Nicaragua will go beyond limits acceptable to us and to others, and we will be confronted with the real prospect of the coming to power of a second revolutionary Marxist regime in this hemisphere." On this question, Zorinsky recommended that the United States help to get rid of Somoza, "if it is possible diplomatically, and if necessary by military means."⁵

Forced to consider the determining role of the SNLF and the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction in the Nicaraguan situation and the authority of the revolutionary forces outside the country and fearing the further "radicalization" of the revolutionary process and the spread of the rebel struggle to other Central American countries with dictatorial regimes, the Carter Administration decided to establish official contacts with the members of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua in the search for the ways for a "peaceful settlement."

Characteristically the first official contacts were established immediately after the American plan of creating "inter-American armed forces" to be sent to Nicaragua was rejected by the 17th OAS Foreign Ministers Conference (June 1979). Here the U.S. Ambassador W. Bowdler (now Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) held talks with representatives from the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua in San Jose, Costa Rica, while the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Managua, L. Pozzullo (who, however, had not presented his credentials to Somoza) actively was "consulting" with the dictator and his supporters.

From the evidence in the American press, the course of the direct contacts which started at the end of June 1979 between Ambassador Bowdler and the members of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, the United States initially endeavored to secure an agreement that Somoza would depart by himself creating a government with "broad representation," but this idea was immediately and categorically repudiated.⁶

During all the talks, the patriots assumed a steadfast, principled, but at the same time flexible position. Their line was both in consistently defending the national sovereignty and the victories of the Sandinist army, as well as a desire to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and destruction in the country, without permitting U.S. military intervention, and while maintaining a definite level of relations with their northern neighbor in the interests of rebuilding the devastated economy with U.S. financial and economic aid.

Soon after the start of the final SNLF offensive against the Somoza dictatorship, representatives from the Carter Administration began active work among the Latin American governments in seeking out an "unified approach" to settling the Nicaraguan problem. V. Vaky (at that time, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs), W. Bowdler and the specialist for Latin American questions at the National Security Council R. Pastor, were sent to the countries of the Andean Pact, to Costa Rica and Panama.

Considering as a given outside interference into the Nicaraguan revolutionary process for the purpose of undermining the positions of the patriotic forces, the United States came out decisively in favor of "nonintervention," when it was a question of providing aid, particularly military aid, to the Sandinists. Thus, according to information in the American press, one of the purposes of the mission of R. Pastor to Panama was to "caution the

Panamanian government against providing assistance to the Cuban efforts of "military supplies" for the Nicaraguan patriots."

In countering such U.S. maneuvers, the leaders of the Nicaraguan patriots turned to their contacts with the leaders of the Latin American states. They worked out a flexible policy and dispelled the fears of some of them on the question of a "sharp turn to the left," in the nation's political struggle against the overthrow of the dictatorship.

An important result of this work was the decisive rejection by a majority of the 100-member states of the plan worked out by the United States for its armed intervention in Nicaragua under the flag of this organization. This, in the words of F. Castro, shows that "true independence of the Latin American countries from the United States was shown for the first time," and that "a new spirit of independence and anti-imperialism" has been awakened in the Latin American peoples, and that "a great front of democracy, the front of democracy and anti-imperialism in Latin America which is of enormous significance" has formed around the struggle of the peoples of this continent.

However, when the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction offered to accept the American conditions for broadening the guarantees for the preservation of the National Guard, the American Latin American governments, as the press pointed out, were reluctant to put pressure on it, and some of them raised the question of withdrawing aid depending upon the Sandinist position in the talks. Under the existing situation, the junta approved and sent off to the UN Secretary General and to the foreign ministers of the member states of this organization a "plan for ensuring peace" which established the procedure for a peaceful transition of power in the nation, and, in particular, provided for the departure of the associates of the dictatorial regime who had all been responsible for genocide and other major crimes against the Nicaraguan people. The plan guaranteed the life and rights for the members of the National Guard who obeyed the ceasefire, and also provided for the incorporation of some of them in a future national army.³

The junta also announced the membership of the cabinet of ministers which would include representatives of a broad spectrum of the social forces in Nicaragua, including representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia and the labor unions.

The existing compromise at the talks between the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction and the American Ambassador Bowdler provided for the immediate retirement of Somoza and the appointing by the Congress of a new government. The junta should immediately turn over power to the junta. The junta, in turn, assumed the obligation to "avoid repression, provide security for those fearing for their life, to undertake enormous efforts for national reconstruction, to respect human rights and hold free elections." The promise was given that the national army could incorporate members of the National Guard who were not sullied by severe crimes against the Nicaraguan people.

The achieved compromise, as events were to show, was immediately violated by the American side when the temporary "successor" of Somoza endeavored to retain power which he should have immediately turned over to the Provisional Democratic Government of National Reconstruction. Confidence in Washington was undermined from the very first hours of the existence of new Nicaragua.

As a result, this maneuver turned out against U.S. interests, in leading to a situation where its basic hope, the Somoza National Guard, was dissolved in a few hours. "And this was actually too bad," admitted the U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua, L. Pettullo. "In the Guard were elements which had resolved to remain, professionals who wanted to help."¹¹ It is quite obvious whom the "Guardsmen" of Somoza should help.

From the very first days that the Provisional Democratic Government of National Reconstruction was in power, the Carter Administration endeavored to prevent the spread of the Nicaraguan example to other Central American countries, and to influence the domestic situation in Nicaragua in such a manner as even at this stage to prevent its becoming a "second Cuba." For this purpose the United States employed both the more concealed, "flexible" forms of intervention as well as the traditional methods of political, economic and military blackmail.

The balanced and restrained policy of the new Nicaraguan government which stated its desire "to maintain normal diplomatic relations" with the United States, as well as the fear of the American ruling circles (who, incidentally, remembered well the failure of their experience with the victorious Cuban revolution) of "losing Nicaragua," forced them to take measures to establish bilateral ties, but with stipulations. As was stated by the U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance, "if we turn away from Nicaragua, we most certainly will guarantee the collapse of democracy.... We should be patient, steadfast and ready for inevitable differences of opinion. But as long as pluralism flourishes in Nicaragua, and we respect it, I am confident that relations will develop successfully."¹²

The Carter Administration understood "respect for pluralism" in Nicaragua as a strengthening of the positions of the bourgeois and reformist elements in this country as a counterweight to the revolutionary forces rallied around the SRLF and which the United States described as "Marxist." As was pointed out by V. Vaky, the United States was strengthening contacts "with many groups on which depends the existence of a healthy pluralistic society: the church, the labor elements, the press, but most importantly with the private sector, the role of which is vitally important for industrial, agricultural and commercial progress in Nicaragua."¹³

After the victory of the Sandinists, Washington again intensified its work among the bourgeois elements, and focused them against popular power, using, in particular, through its mass information media the bogey of the "leftist danger" and the "threat" to the interests of private entrepreneurship, and frightening them by the fact that the Nicaraguan government was

developing normal relations with the USSR, Cuba and the other socialist countries. On this question the United States openly admitted that the American administration was endeavoring to influence the further development of Nicaragua, in "affecting the balance of political forces of the Sandinistas in the domestic political struggle and the problems separating them."

The CIA and other American agencies made active use of visits by Nicaraguan state leaders to the United States as well as trips by representatives of the White House and members of Congress to Nicaragua.

The United States considered its most important lever for influencing Nicaraguan domestic and foreign policy to be economic aid and the playing with the economic difficulties of the country which had largely been caused by the American support "up to the last" of the Somoza regime.

As a result of the talks in San Jose between Bowdler and the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, one of the important elements in the compromise reached was that the United States promised to give substantial aid in rebuilding the destroyed Nicaraguan economy. However, as was pointed out by the representatives of the revolutionary government, the economic aid provided by the United States to Nicaragua "is certainly not what the United States promised, and in no way is in keeping with the size of that country." Moreover, during the first stage this aid was not of an intergovernmental sort, but rather was given to the Nicaraguan Red Cross.¹⁵

The amount of money needed by Nicaragua for rebuilding its economy was, according to American estimates, 4 billion dollars.¹⁶ The United States provided Nicaragua with "extraordinary aid" amounting to 8 million dollars. In the words of S. Ramirez, a number of other countries offered Nicaraguans aid "without any strings attached," but "only the United States imposed demands."¹⁷ This applies particularly to the economic aid for the 1986 fiscal year amounting to 75 million dollars, and 60 percent, in accord with the American provisions, is to go to support the private sector, 70 million dollars out of the designated total are for credits and loans to buy industrial, agricultural and other goods directly in the United States.

In the course of the months-long discussion of the question of granting this aid in the U.S. Congress, the stipulation was made that the Nicaraguan government would guarantee "human rights" in the country, that "free elections" would be held, that "freedom of press and speech" would be ensured, and also that "if Cuban and Soviet troops enter Nicaragua, the providing of aid will immediately halt."¹⁸ The discussion of the question of aid was repeatedly shut off by the Congress. One of the pretexts was, for example, the demand of Congressman R. Bowman to study the "secret document" of the U.S. intelligence agencies about the "communist influence in Nicaragua and the support provided by Cuba to the guerrilla movement in neighboring countries." Such tactics clearly recall the unsuccessful maneuvering of reactionary American legislators over the question of ratifying the

Panama Treaty. The reference to the CIA "secret documents," as the Nicaraguan journalists have pointed out, affirms the intervention of this U.S. espionage agency into the internal affairs of Nicaragua.¹⁹

The American Congressmen and the representatives of the administration endeavored to link the decision about aid with the position of Nicaragua in the United Nations on the so-called "Afghan question," and to put corresponding pressure on the Nicaraguan government. As was pointed out by the American press, on the eve of the voting at the United Nations on this question, the U.S. Ambassador in Managua, L. Fetzullo, "strongly recommended" that the Nicaraguan government realize the link between this voting and the American aid, and on this occasion the member of the national leadership of the SSLE, the Minister of Internal Affairs, T. Borge, stated: "We prefer to die from hunger than follow recommendations on how we should vote."²⁰

American representatives have also resorted to various anti-Nicaraguan maneuvers in the international financial organizations where the Nicaraguan government is taking measures to reorganize its external financial obligations which are, as a result of imperialist exploitation of the country, some 1.5 billion dollars.²¹ On the question of all these maneuvers, D. Ortega has said that "at the same time that the United States has never before disputed the necessity of granting aid to the Somoza regime, it is approving 400 million dollars of military aid for Pakistan and a million in military support for El Salvador, it has declared war on our people."²² Washington has not abandoned attempts to influence the political course of Nicaragua through the governments of certain Latin American as well as Western European countries.

However, not wishing to "turn away" from Nicaragua and "throw it into the embrace of communism," the Carter Administration introduced in Congress a proposal to grant 25 million dollars in economic aid to Nicaragua in the 1981 fiscal year, as well as certain funds for purchasing American weapons and training armed forces personnel. In providing for military aid to the country, the United States has not concealed its plans to at least some degree to neutralize the strong anti-American mood among the Sandinists and related to the years-long military and other U.S. support for the Somoza regime. At the same time the United States is endeavoring to prevent the Nicaraguan government from seeking weapons primarily from the socialist states. On the other hand, the American administration still fears causing a negative reaction among the neighboring military dictatorships in supplying arms to Nicaragua, particularly in the event of a "substantial turn to the left" in its political course.

Recently, when the Carter Administration has turned to a policy of intensifying international tension, American economic aid to Nicaragua has been frozen. Thus, in the course of trips by emissaries from Washington throughout the countries of Central and South America and even Western Europe, measures have been undertaken to isolate Nicaragua politically and militarily for the purpose of preventing any influence on events in El Salvador, Guatemala and other neighboring states where a rise in the liberation

movement can be seen. There have been more frequent demonstrations of American "military muscle" in the region of Central American and the Caribbean Basin. At the beginning of the present year U.S. military maneuvers were held in the Panama Canal Zone, and greater activities were shown by the "Caribbean Task Force," one of the purposes of which is to frighten Nicaragua over the "consequences" of carrying out a truly independent policy. Plans are being hatched to create "Caribbean patrol forces." And not least, the threats of U.S. military intervention in El Salvador are also directed against Nicaragua. One other measure to strengthen American military presence in Central America was the holding of a conference at the end of February 1980 in the Panama Canal Zone for the military and civilian leaders of the United States together with representatives of the Latin American countries.

The main concern of the United States vis-a-vis Nicaragua remains the countering of the strengthening of Nicaraguan relations with the USSR, Cuba and the other socialist countries. American specialists have pointed out that "the threat to U.S. interests is not socialism in Nicaragua, but rather the establishing of close Nicaraguan ties with the USSR."¹ American official representatives see a "threat" to the national interests of the United States even in the presence of Cuban teachers in this country. However, J. Borge during a visit of a party and governmental delegation of Nicaragua to the USSR in March 1980 stressed that "we take our own decisions, and for this reason we are here. We are free and we are using this freedom."²

The Nicaraguan patriots have drawn their own conclusions from the history of U.S. interference into the internal affairs of their country, and have drawn lessons from the Chilean experience and from the practice of Washington's aggression against the Cuban revolution. The Nicaraguan people are showing great caution for the "new flexibility" in the approach of the United States to the Sandinist revolution, and are making a decisive rebuff to the attempts of Washington to intervene in the revolutionary process.

Against the background of the American policy of undermining the Nicaraguan revolution, the completely different type of relations between the USSR and the new Nicaragua is assuming particular strength and international recognition. As was pointed out in the joint Soviet-Nicaraguan communique, these relations are developing "on a basis of strict observance of the principles of equality, sovereignty, mutual respect and noninterference into the internal affairs of one another."² The solidarity of the USSR, the fraternal socialist countries and all progressive forces of the world with the Nicaraguan revolution is an important factor for countering the imperialist maneuvers against Nicaragua.

FOOTNOTES

¹THE BALTIMORE SUN, 9 July 1979.

- ²NEWSWEEK, 27 November 1978, p 27.
- ³THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 March 1979.
- ⁴Ibid., 24 June 1979.
- ⁵CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Washington, 13 July 1979.
- ⁶THE WASHINGTON POST, 21 July 1979.
- ⁷THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 June 1979.
- ⁸GRANMA, Havana, 28 July 1979.
- ⁹OAS DOCUMENT OEA/2.3-33/79, 16 July 1979.
- ¹⁰THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 July 1979.
- ¹¹NEWSWEEK, 30 July 1979, p 31.
- ¹²"U.S. Department of State. Press Release," Washington, 27 September 1979.
- ¹³"U.S. Relations with the Caribbean and Central America," U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, 1979, p 9.
- ¹⁴FOREIGN AFFAIRS, New York, Vol 58, No 1, 1979, p 28.
- ¹⁵THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 August 1979.
- ¹⁶FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol 58, No 1, 1979, p 40.
- ¹⁷THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 July 1979.
- ¹⁸NEWSWEEK, 7 January 1980.
- ¹⁹GRANMA, 25 February 1980.
- ²⁰THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Boston, 20 January 1980.
- ²¹THE NEW YORK TIMES, 10 July 1979.
- ²²GRANMA, 22 February 1980.
- ²³FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol 58, No 1, 1979, p 48.
- ²⁴PRAVDA, 20 March 1980.
- ²⁵Ibid.

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INTERNATIONAL

SHAKHNAZAROV ON STATE OF ALL PEOPLE, WORKERS' POWER

Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 19 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Doctor of Legal Sciences G. Shakhnazarov: "The Power of the Working Class and the State of All the People"]

[Text] The conclusion concerning the Soviet state's conversion from an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a political organization of all the people was drawn by the CPSU on the basis of an analysis of the qualitative changes which have occurred in Soviet society. This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that the sociopolitical and ideological unity of all classes and strata of the population, which crossed over to the positions of the working class, became established in our country. Thus the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat as the form of the political leadership of society disappeared. It is appropriate to recall that even prior to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution V.I. Lenin pointed to the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat only in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. This idea was enshrined in the 1918 RSFSR Constitution and in the 1919 Ukrainian SSR Constitution.

Of course, individual statements could not have served as an adequate theoretical basis for political conclusions, even less for the corresponding practical transformations. After all, it is not just a matter simply of giving the state a new name. It was necessary to comprehensively evaluate the changes that had occurred in the process of socialist transformations in the economy and culture, production relations and the social structure and come up with a suitable solution to the problems of controlling society and radically improving the entire political system. The examination of the issue culminated in the adoption of the new USSR Constitution in October 1977.

The idea of the state of all the people was adopted by many communist and workers parties of the socialist countries and enshrined as their program requirement. At the same time revisionist and reformist theoreticians attempted to use the proposition of the state of all the people as evidence that the dictatorship of the proletariat had become outdated or was even altogether a mistake. Beijing, on the other hand, declared this proposition a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. It is not difficult, however, to see that these outwardly seemingly diametrically opposite positions conceal one and

the same endeavor--to artificially counterpose democracy and the political power of the working class. The power of the proletariat is not to the liking of the right, proletarian democracy is not to the liking of the "leftists." The fact that the conclusion concerning the conversion of the Soviet state into a state of all the people had been precisely formulated in CPSU documents is of fundamental significance in this connection. First, this conversion became possible as a consequence of the fulfillment by the dictatorship of the proletariat of its historic mission in the USSR; second, the working class's leading role in society is objectively preserved in the state of all the people; and, third, the state of all the people continues to fulfill in the international arena the functions which ensue from the international duty of the working class, which had come to power.

Criticizing the idea of the state of all the people, various theoreticians from the reformist camp even recommend that Marxists renounce the very hegemony of the working class. Such counsel is substantiated, moreover, by references to objective changes in the social structure brought about by the scientific-technical revolution.

Indeed, we can currently observe a rapid growth in labor skills, and unskilled manpower is being superseded as a consequence. For example, at enterprises producing electronic equipment scientific research and engineering-technical personnel and employees constitute four-fifths of total personnel. And there is no reason to dispute Western economists' forecasts that from 80 to 95 percent of those employed in the most technology-intensive sectors of industry will be recruited from the ranks of engineers, technicians and specialists with diplomas in various fields by the year 2000.

Bourgeois and, in concert with them, reformist ideologists draw the following conclusion from these facts and assumptions: the proletariat is gradually disappearing, being deproletarianized and dissolving into some kind of middle class. Thus it is gradually being integrated into the capitalist system inasmuch as the middle class has no reason to encroach on the existing orders.

The entire point, however, is that bourgeois ideologists are passing off the wish for the reality. The social changes connected with the scientific-technical revolution corroborate neither the old nor the new versions of the bourgeois theories which attempt to belittle or reduce to nothing the economic and sociopolitical significance of the working class. On the contrary, in the new structure of the production forces it objectively plays an even more important part than before insofar as it becomes the cocreator and controller of powerful equipment and the principal character of the entire production process and no longer merely its "basement" oriented predominantly toward physical labor. The development of modern production is proceeding hand in hand with a numerical growth of the proletariat and the involvement in its composition of new social groups.

Official statistical data testify incontrovertibly not to the deproletarianization but, on the contrary, to the broadening of the ranks of the working

class. Thus from 1950 through 1973 the numbers of workers in industry, construction and transportation in the United States grew 15.3 percent and reached 21.9 million people, including the 15 million workers of heavy and light industry constituting the factory-plant proletariat. In aggregate the working class of the production sphere has risen to 26 million persons, and if we add to this the constantly growing detachment of workers employed in the nonproduction sphere, the overall number amounts to 59 million--the overwhelming majority of the gainfully employed population.

Let us suppose, however, that the forecasts which say that even in the near future the proportion of mental labor will considerably exceed that of physical labor and that, subsequently, the former will supersede the latter entirely come about in full. Incidentally, this conforms in principle with the concept of Marxism-Leninism concerning the surmounting of the essential differences between the two main types of labor activity. Let us also assume that this will occur before the transition to socialism is accomplished worldwide. Does it follow from this that any problem of the struggle of the workers of hired labor against the capitalist system and, in particular, against relations based on capitalist private ownership is removed altogether? By no means. In a society where on the one hand capital and, on the other, hired labor (irrespective of the collars worn by the workers--white, blue or black) are preserved, antagonism will remain also. It is simply that the working class will be represented therein by hired and exploited workers of mental labor.

It may be objected that, as experience shows, among workers of mental labor the gravitation toward cooperation with the powers that be is strong and that they will hardly conceive a desire to take on themselves the reorganization of society, even less by way of revolution. Indeed, as is frequently the case now also, a certain proportion of the most highly paid specialists will gravitate toward collaboration with the ruling stratum. As far as the bulk of the future "white-collar" workers is concerned, their frame of mind, including their capacity for being imbued with revolutionary fervor, will be determined not by the type of labor in which they are engaged but by the extent of their exploitation. Intellectuals are no less capable of wishing for socialism than workers.

The power of the working class will grow simultaneously with the development of these processes. It has already proven in practice its directing role in society's development, having acquired political competence and knowledge along the entire perimeter of modern science and technology and having mastered the pinnacles of scientific management in a comparatively short time. This is now a real fact confirmed by the entire history of the building of socialism in the USSR and a number of other countries.

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CSO: 1800

NATIONAL

KOMSOMOL RAYKOMS' LAXITY ALLOWS CROP LOSSES

Voronezhskaya Oblast Report

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Aug 80 p 1

[T. Khoroshilova report: "Where Are You, Raykom Members?"]

[Text] Liskinskiy Rayon--In half an hour there was not a single call to the traffic-control group directing the motor transport of Liskinskiy Rayon.

"This year there has not been an occasion when any farm has been short of vehicles," traffic controller A.S. Kolomytsev explained. "On the contrary. We occasionally have to remove some of the vehicles from the harvesting routes to prevent them standing idle. For today only six farms have requests in for grain to be shipped from the threshing floors to the elevator. For tomorrow only three. So not many vehicles are needed."

To persuade ourselves of the truth of his words we set off for the Davydovskiy Elevator. There was not a single vehicle loaded with grain at the pass-issuing facility.

"I was afraid that two unloaders would not be enough to cater for the operation of such a powerful elevator," Elevator Director M.F. Illarionov said. "But even these often have nothing to do. We have received in a month grain which can be handled in 2 days."

Why is the grain being handed over to the state by the farms so poorly? Reference is made in the rayon to the dry summer, which drew the moisture from the ears and left the grain shriveled. But alarm signals are being received in the "Komsomol Searchlight" headquarters: people cannot harvest what has been cultivated in the fields without losses and they are failing to get it to the elevator.

Yellow trails of grain on the shoulders of the highway catch the eye. Not a kilo or two but quintals of spilled grain were scattered about in the dust.

"At the Lisinskoye Motor-Transport Enterprise-4, where I work," driver Nikolay Gar'kovskiy explained, "we were not given canopies. You can take as many as you wish for the GAZ-51, but they have not yet been sewn up for the large-capacity motor vehicles. So you have to get them by hook or by crook. Sometimes you are happy to get even a torn one. At least some of the grain will be covered. After all, you cannot get by without canopies on our roads. Particularly those which lead to remote farms. Hollows and ruts."

Indeed, not far from the rayon center, beyond Davydovka, the asphalt became dirt road. The vehicle rolled from side to side and skidded onto the shoulders. The "Kolkhida," which was loaded with grain, was skidding ahead of us, and its back was jolting so violently that a golden stream of grain was spurting out from under the canopy and landing on the ground. The spots which had not been smoothed and pounded down with gravel by the road builders were being filled in with grain.

Stopping on the outskirts of the village of Selyanoye, we set off for the threshing floor of the "Donskoy" Kolkhoz. The grain lay right there on the ground, which had neither been stamped down or covered with straw, and streams of wheat were seeping into the cracks in the ground.

The day before's rain had flattened the storage piles and swept the grain all over the yard. We found neither canopies with which it should be covered in wet weather nor special fixtures nor, as a last resort, even ordinary boards which could have prevented the grain being carried away with the water.

We covered the whole village looking for threshing floor chief P. Ye. Chesnokov, but, not finding him, headed for the second kolkhoz threshing floor. Here the grain was stored on asphalted areas and some under awnings even. But at the fence we saw the same picture as at the first threshing floor. The grain had been washed here by streams of rainfall.

"It is nothing, it will dry out and be used for fodder for the livestock," threshing floor chief M.D. Pastushkov blithely reasoned. "It will amount to just 5 quintals."

We explain that it is not a question of just any grain but of 500 kilos of selected seed wheat.

The grain areas at the threshing floor of the "Davydovskiy" Kolkhoz which we visited were found to be in order, and some of the storage piles were covered with canopies. The grain from the remainder was being carried by the conveyor to the vehicles. The loading was proceeding slowly, and in order to speed it up a tractor had been fitted with a hopper and it was additionally loading the vehicle.

"There is a shortage of grain-handling equipment," threshing floor chief P. Ye. Snaykin complained. "Every year it is replaced in the fields, but

we are the last in line. We were forced to appeal to our patrons, the workers of the Georgiu-Dezhskiy Oil-Extraction Plant for the installation of one more grain-cleaning unit. They delivered it to us 3 years ago, but they cannot get it set up."

Vehicles carrying grain from the combines were arriving at the threshing floor of the neighboring "Voskhod" Kolkhoz. But the barley was tiny and weedy. The decision to drive to the field where it came from was automatic.

We found brigade leader Valentina Shchukina checking the quality of the threshed grain yield. Making a simple calculation involving the grain in the chaff, she bitterly admitted that the losses were considerable.

The rain, which has now stopped, prolonged the harvesting. The barley was about 2 days overripe. The rolls are dry on top. As far as just the spikelets of the thresher are concerned, they are shattered here, but at the bottom the ears are damp. The grain from them threshes badly and remains in the straw. But it is not only the wet weather which is the reason for the poor-quality harvesting. Wherever you walk you can pick up unthreshed ears in the stubble from which a hefty sheaf could easily be quickly gathered. Perhaps the schoolchildren or the kolkhoz members' wives follow the combines to glean the ears?

"No," Valentina shook her head, "the personnel situation is bad here. We did not even think to call on the boys."

To a question concerning the amount of yield of the field, the brigade leader shrugged uncertainly.

"It was 15 quintals per hectare before the rain. Now less."

The vehicles crossing the field press the lost ears into the ground. This is how the barley is threshed—by the wheels of the combines and motor vehicles.

Minor blunders, it would seem: holes in the canopies, ruts in the roads, unthreshed ears in the field, but the result is lost grain. It is being lost through the fault of the motor transport workers, who have made a poor job of fitting out the harvesting machinery, and the traveling highway sector workers, who have not gotten around to putting the roadway in order, and on account of the lax management which reigns at the threshing floors. The sooner an end is put to the losses, the better the public granaries will be filled. Let's get things in order.

Komsomol Central Committee Criticism

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Aug 80 p 1

[Komsomol Central Committee decree on the article "Where Are You, Raykom Members?" published in KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA of 24 August 1980]

[Text] KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA of 24 August this year carried an article entitled "Where Are You, Raykom Members?" which dealt with shortcomings in the activity of Voronezhskaya Oblast's Komsomol committees in mobilizing the young people for the harvesting. Earlier the paper had carried a number of articles on the inadequate organizing and mass-political work of the Komsomol organizations of Belgorodskaya, Kalininskaya and Khar'kovskaya oblasts in the period of the harvesting campaign.

There are instances of the Komsomol committees' formal attitude in the organization of the socialist competition of the young men and women engaged in the harvesting, the work of the Komsomol-youth fodder-producing collectives, the struggle against losses of grain, vegetables and other agricultural products and the social life and recreation of the young workers. Certain Komsomol committees are failing to display due initiative and high-mindedness in enlisting young people in the preparations for the wintering of the livestock: the creation of dependable stocks of fodder for public animal husbandry, the modernization and repair of the livestock sections and the construction and continuous operation of the fodder preparation shops and units.

The Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat resolves:

1. To point out to the Komsomol's Voronezhskiy Obkom Bureau (Comrade A.S. Yezhikov) the existing shortcomings in the mobilization of the young people for the timely and high-quality harvesting.

That the union republic Komsomol central committees and the Komsomol kraykoms and obkoms must adopt additional measures to insure the concrete and effective participation of the Komsomol organizations and young men and women in the harvesting, the struggle against losses of cultivated agricultural products, fodder procurement and preparation of the livestock units for the winter period.

2. That the editorial offices of KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA and the oblast, kray and republic Komsomol newspapers and the youth editorial offices of radio and television must increase the illustration of the participation of Komsomol members and young people in the harvesting operations, persistently propagandize examples of highly productive work and progressive experience and resolutely expose and persistently strive to put an end to existing shortcomings.

The decree adopted by the Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat is addressed today to every committee of the Komsomol, which is called on to commission all potential resources.

Of course, the severe weather trials have made performance of the entire complex of operations more difficult. But where the work has been organized with regard for the whims of the weather, it has been possible to maneuver the equipment and maintain the pace of fodder procurement. Unfortunately, all the youth's resources in providing animal husbandry with fodder have been mobilized far from fully in Tambovskaya, Penzenskaya, Kalininskaya, Kirovskaya and Smolenskaya oblasts. Sluggishness has also been displayed in this matter in the Chuvashskaya, Mariyskaya and Bashkirskaya ASSR's. The Komsomol's Omskiy Obkom is failing to display due energy in the creation of a fodder base.

It should be emphasized that in certain Ural and West Siberian oblasts, where there is a big harvest of grasses, the Komsomol committees must step up the pace of fodder procurement.

It is the Komsomol committees' duty to display the maximum energy to procure as much hay as possible, lay in haylage and silage and provide the livestock sections with grass meal. There is more straw than in any other year. But the fodder shops are not operating everywhere. The fodder shops are in need of urgent repair at many livestock sections. After all, the fodder simply has to be steamed. The task today is to insure that each livestock section has an operating fodder shop.

The Komsomol committees have accumulated sufficient practical experience of joint work with the farm authorities. The point is to insure that this experience be applied everywhere and turn into high indicators of the production of animal husbandry products.

Comrade Komsomol organizers, comrade Komsomol members! There is currently no more responsible task than the unconditional fulfillment of the first commandment. Over the entire boundless field of harvesting operations the Komsomol-youth collectives, whether they be combine operators, drivers or grain driers, are models of selfless and heroic labor, zealotness and thrift. And we must be all the more intolerant of instances of complacency and low procurement discipline. Furthermore, an incomprehensible attitude toward preservation of public property--grain--is displayed in some places. The grain must not be allowed to accumulate on the threshing floors, spoil and be lost during shipment to the elevators.

It is the Komsomol committees' patriotic duty to insure by all means of ideological and organizing work the young people's effective participation in fulfillment of the first commandment--this sacred and illustrious tradition of all generations of the Lenin Komsomol.

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CSO: 1800

REGIONAL

UKRAINIAN PARTY ORGANIZATIONS STUDY PUBLIC OPINION

Kiev FOR ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA in Russian No 13, Jul 80 pp 33-35

Article by V. Polovets, secretary of the Chernigovskiy okrug of the Ukrainian Communist Party: "Study, Form Public Opinion"

[Text] The party committee of one of Chernigov's largest enterprises -- the "Khimvolokno" Association -- examined the question of speeding up the transition periods of shop and complexes to new technological equipment. The directors of the leading services and the specialists of the enterprise spoke with detailed information. The decision remained to be made....

Suddenly the question rang out:

"But how do the workers regard the innovations? Has the party committee studied the opinion of the collective?"

This question was justified. It has firmly become a rule in the work practices of our oblast's party organizations: When solving this or that problem, to find out what the people think about it, what is public opinion regarding it, and to take this into consideration in daily work. Then during the session of the association's party committee, a point was introduced into the decision which was adopted: to use every resource of ideological influence to form an interested attitude and ensure the active participation of all collective members in carrying out the program for transferring production to the new technological rails.

Our party has a wonderful tradition -- it consults with the people on each important matter. Under the conditions of developed socialism where society has reached a high stage in the movement toward social uniformity and where the state has become a state of all the people, the role of the workers' opinion in organizing political and economic activity has grown considerably. The 25th CPSU Congress and the new Constitution of the USSR have convincingly emphasized this. The decree, "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Industrial Work", points out that when solving the tasks of

democratization it is necessary "to pay special attention to the deep and comprehensive study of public opinion and sociological research."

The force of public opinion is a constructive force. Party work practices, themselves, convince one of this. For example, until recently during the meetings of kolkhoz members and the sessions and conferences of farm directors and agricultural specialists in our oblast the opinion was frequently expressed that, when summing up the results of socialist competition and when evaluating the effectiveness of work in crop cultivation, the productivity-per-hectare indicator could not serve as an objective evaluation criteria. It did not take into consideration the differences in the natural fertility of the land of the competing farms. As is known, our oblast is located in two climatic zones -- the Poles'ye and the Lesostepi. What kind of equal conditions can one talk about if one farm sows grain on sandy soil and the other -- on fertile black earth?

Having paid attention to this, they introduced a new rating indicator -- a productivity per hectare rating. This permitted the competition conditions to be compared by collectives and stimulated the search for progressive agrotechnical methods. Naturally, the socialist competition for effective use of the land became more effective and concrete. The movement was expanded among the rural workers under the slogan: "A badge of quality for each field." At the present time, the title of "Farm of High Agricultural Crops" has been awarded to 72 kolkhoz and sovkhoz, and the oblast's experience in the rational use of the land has been commended by the CPSU Central Committee.

The result of the search convinced us of the need to create a system for the study of public opinion and to use its results to improve political work. Based on a decision of the party obkom bureau, an oblast council to study public opinion was created two years ago. Councils like this are now functioning in the city and rayon party committees.

The composition of the oblast council consists of 35 people -- representatives of party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs and public organizations. They are combined into six sections -- party-political, moral-legal, social services, general information, sociological research, and one for studying the attitudes of the different population groups.

The task of systematically providing the oblast party committee bureau with information on today's most urgent problems, which are being examined in the obkom, and of developing -- with a consideration of public opinion -- recommendations for party committees and the ideological aktiv to improve explanatory and indoctrinational work, has been placed on the oblast council. The council is also responsible for coordinating the activity of the city and rayon councils for studying public opinion. The meetings of the councils are held once a quarter.

What are the functions and role of the sections in the work of this ideological institute?

The Party-Political Information Section analyzes the workers' comments on the most important political events and questions which are asked by listeners during lectures, political information exchanges, discussions, and political studies, and conducts a public poll on this or that direction in the activity of the party committees. Thus, public opinion is studied and considered when preparing practically every question for examination during plenums, aktiv meetings and party committee bureau sessions. Ways to form it are defined in the decisions which are adopted.

The purposeful study of public opinion is conducted by means of sociological research and polls. For example, during the preparation of the question, "On Further Raising the Level of Organizational and Mass Political Work by Party Organizations in Developing Socialist Competition in Light of the Example of the 25th CPSU Congress," for review by the Cherniavskiy party committee. In June, sociological research was performed in 17 of the city's enterprises using the questionnaire method. The conclusions drawn from the results of the poll permitted the socialist competition conditions to be improved and ensured its wide publicity. Repeat research in these same collectives revealed a growth in the authority and effectiveness of socialist competition. In particular, the members of the work collectives gave a high evaluation to the practice of defending socialist obligations.

The Moral Legal Information Section studies and analyzes the legal situation and the state of public order, and condenses information on family relations.

The study of the workers' comments on personal services and -- medical, material, trade, and cultural services are continuously in the sight of the Social Services Information Section.

The General Information Section studies and analyzes the workers' letters and statements and tourists' comments on excursion services.

The Council also devoted constant attention to studying the attitudes of individual population groups -- youth, women, pensioners, housewives.

This complex approach to the study and processing of information guarantees -- it seems to us -- both completeness and thoroughness in the study of public opinion.

The Council and its sections maintain continuous communication with the different organizations and institutions which provide them with verified and effective information. Thus, for example, information on the interests of pupils and students arrives from the obkom, raykoms and gorkoms of the Komsomol, the rayon public education sections, and military commissariats. The Council informs the bureau for labor management and the use of labor resources about the causes for personnel turbulence in this or that enterprise. Considerable material arrives from Zhuk party organizations, social security organs, party veteran councils, ZAGS [registry] offices, people's courts, etc.

Naturally, the party, soviet and administrative organs and the mass information and propaganda systems -- press, television and radio-- are an important and more capacious source for the council for studying public opinion.

We strive to develop and support the constructive force of public opinion in every way possible. The oblast party organizations see in the paying of more attention to positive examples of work and to the experiences of progressive people and innovators and of patriotic initiatives and calls and in the instilling of intolerance for any deviation from socialist norms of morality, an important condition for the success of these efforts.

All this creates a favorable moral psychological climate in work collectives and a situation of creative research, and contributes to the development of the workers' labor and social-political activity.

A general indicator of the fruitful efforts of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and of soviet and economic organs is the awarding of the temporary Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUGCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee for four years in a row to our oblast for its successes in the All-Union Socialist Competition.

A significant source of information is the editorial mail of oblast, city rayon, and rayon newspapers. The workers' letters are a distinctive type of barometer which objectively reflects public opinion, touching its deepest layers. Therefore, the councils for studying public opinion analyze with great attention the nature of the editorial mail, and are constantly guided by this analysis when developing summaries and recommendations.

What do the letters of the workers to the party committee, the ispolkom of the Council of People's Deputies and the editors primarily testify to today? In the majority of them it is the growing political activity of the people and their desire to carry out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress successfully and increase their contribution to solving the tasks of the 10th Five-Year Plan. More than 10,000 suggestions, of which 90 percent have already been realized, have come from the inhabitants of the city of Chernigov since the beginning of the five-year plan.

The analysis of the workers' letters when studying public opinion contributes to the search for new and more effective forms in working with them. For example, the oblast newspaper DESNYANS'KA PRAVDA has begun to hold an "Open Letter Day." One was recently held in the Novozavodskiy Rayon of the oblast center. Here is how this mass measure was conducted.

Long before meeting with the readers, posters, informing about the "Open Letter Day", and post office boxes for letters were hung in all the rayon's large industrial enterprises. All the letters which were received were grouped according to their problems. Answers to the questions contained in them were prepared by the chairman of the gorispolkom, workers of the rayispolkom, directors of the enterprises and various services of the rayon, and journal-

lets. The workers, employees, youth who were studying -- representatives of all the rayon's population groups -- assembled on one of their free days in the Chemists' Palace of Culture. It was not simply a meeting to solve this or that question. It was an open exchange of opinions on problems of vital importance which undoubtedly contributed both to the instilling of activity in the people and to the formation of a definite public opinion with respect to the problems disturbing an urban dweller.

Speaker and political informer groups and agitation collectives play a large role in the study and formations of public opinion. They can judge public opinion from the nature and content of the listeners' questions and comments. United political days also help us in this.

Not long ago the party obkom adopted a decree which required party, Soviet and economic organs and the mass propaganda and information systems of the oblast to thoroughly analyze and consider in their practical work the questions asked of lecturers, speakers, other party committee workers, and the ideological aktiv which touch upon the problems of organizing and improving the work of the oblast industrial enterprises, kolkhos, sovkhoz, cultural and personal services, and public life.

Oblast party organizations are continuously improving the forms and methods of ideological and indoctrinational work with a consideration for public opinion. It is taken into consideration, for example, when developing topics for lectures, discussions and reports and when selecting some form or other of mass political influence. Thus, when analyzing the effectiveness of propaganda work, the party-political information section of the oblast council for studying public opinion established that such forms of mass propaganda as evening question and answer sessions and "round table" discussions ensured the greatest interest and high attendance. It was recommended that these work forms be practiced more widely.

An analysis made by the councils in the collectives showed that problems of morality evoked great interest in the people. The fact that newspaper and magazine material, movies, and television shows on this subject enjoy steady popularity testifies to this also.

However, we noted that publications on the subject of morals at times concentrate attention only on negative phenomena, and we took steps to eliminate this disproportion. Now, more attention is paid to the revealing of moral purity and the height of the moral position of a Soviet individual. This avenue became the basic one in oral political propaganda and agitation and in press and local radio material. Thus, the oblast newspaper *IZBYANS'KA PRAVDA* unveiled on its pages the column, "Your Moral Values". I. F. Odintsov a delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress and a lathe operator in the Nezhinskiy Mechanic Plant, began it with a discussion of the duty of a citizen and the honor of a worker. The subject soon shifted from the pages of the newspaper to the hall of the work collective. It evoked continuous interest there.

The constant study of public opinion enriches our economic and social practices with new and important features, and helps the broad interests and needs of the workers to be better and more thoroughly considered in economic, ideological and public activity.

An effective help to the oblast party committees was the research conducted by the workers of the Kiev branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Social Sciences and the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy. The summaries of the scientists on questions pertaining to the instilling of atheistic convictions and the increases in the effectiveness of the process of forming valuable orientations in the area of work activity helped us to plan the work of the councils for studying public opinion in these important avenues of ideological work.

At the same time, oblast party organizations are experiencing a number of difficulties in the work of studying and forming public opinion. They are primarily linked with the practices of conducting sociological research. Thus, practical workers need scientifically sound type programs for studying public opinion and centrally developed questionnaires for the polls.

An increase in the level of the party workers' sociological knowledge is also desirable. Evidently, in order to solve this task it would be advisable to devote in the programs of party training institutions more attention to studying questions on the methodology, methods and techniques of concrete sociological research and the conduct of practical classes on these subjects. The benefit from a broad exchange of party organization experiences would also be unquestionable.

In his report to the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized the need to approach in a solicitous manner all that is positive in our work, and regard derelictions and shortcomings critically. This now determines the content and direction of the activity of the oblast party organizations and the councils for studying public opinion.

In developing the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress, party committees are striving to put into operation every reserve to successfully fulfill and overfulfill the plans for the concluding year of the 10th Five-Year Plan and to ensure stable work during the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. As practice shows, some of these reserves are the constructive capabilities of public opinion.

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REGIONAL

PROBLEMS OF DECREASING AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE IN LITHUANIA

Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 1 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Juozas Kontautas and Vytautas Skebas, scientific researchers of the Agricultural Economics Institute (Žemės ūkio ekonomikos institutas), Biržai rayon, entitled "For the Farms, a New Generation of Trained Agricultural Specialists" and "Occupational Schools Are the Way"]

[Text] In 1959, 61 percent of the population of the republic lived in rural Lithuania, while in 1979 the picture is quite different: now 61 percent of the people live in cities and only 39 percent in rural areas.

During the last decade, the rural population decreased by about 1.5 percent annually, while the agricultural labor force decreased by over 2 percent. This is why there is a labor shortage on some farms. This is especially true in the rayons of the north and northeast, where there are farms having more than 20 hectares of farm land for each able-bodied agricultural worker (the republic average is 9.7 hectares).

In Biržai rayon, the ratio is 12.5 hectares of farm land for each able-bodied collective farmer. However, the situation is not the same on all rayon farms. For example, on the Pabiržė, Kirdonys and "Tarybinis artojas" ("Soviet Plowman") collective farms the number is 7-9 hectares of farm land, while on the Papilys, "Auksinė varpa" ("Golden Ear of Grain") and Elnoriai collective farms it is 17-18 hectares.

With the continuing spread of technological progress, agricultural specialists and qualified mass profession cadres become the determining force in the countryside. A lack of the latter especially hinders the development of production. There is a shortage of qualified mass profession specialists on the farms of Biržai rayon. For example, at the beginning of 1979, for every 100 tractors and combines there were, on the average, only 87 tractor operators. For these and other reasons, persons in the aforementioned occupations worked not 240 but 250 work days annually.

And that's not all. The so-called aging trend of agricultural workers is also evident: about 24-25 percent of the population of collective

farms is of retirement age. It is true that many of them participate actively in social production. But this is not the primary work force.

Given such a situation, it is especially important to prepare a new generation of agricultural workers for the future. And this is what perceptive farm managers are doing. From the "Laisvoji Žemė" ("Free Land") collective farm alone, 11 people are studying with the help of farm scholarships. The collective farm has many young people under the age of 30--21 percent of all able-bodied workers. More than half of them are qualified mass profession specialists.

The Pabiržė collective farm has well-outfitted mechanical repair shops and other production buildings, and that is why on this farm the problem of machine operators and other trained personnel, it can be said, is nonexistent. This is a major achievement of the collective farm chairman, Alfonsas Mikelėnas.

But the same cannot be said about the Biržai rayon's Papilys collective farm. This is one of the farms where the labor shortage is most acute. And there is nothing surprising about that: although the farm center is in a pleasant little town, the last house the collective farm paid for was built five years ago. The mechanical repair shops are old, small and poorly outfitted; only two tractors at a time can be repaired there. Such working and living conditions understandably do not encourage young people to choose agricultural occupations.

Matters concerning livestock raising specialists are a cause for concern. Close to two thousand people in the Biržai rayon work in this field. That is not many. To institute the five-day work week everywhere, it would be necessary to hire an additional four hundred people. But where are they going to come from?

The education of milkers is of special concern. Only the "Švyturys" ("Beacon") and "Žemė maitintoja" ("The Nourishing Earth") collective farms have a larger number of milkers who have completed secondary school.

Such a situation did not arise by chance. Work in livestock production field is not easy, but people are most often discouraged from working on these specialized farms by the poor working conditions. This applies, of course, not only to the mechanical equipment on farms, or to living quarters. Working conditions include regular vacations, the number of work days and job regimen. If milkmaids begin work at 5 o'clock in the morning, one can hardly expect to find young people on dairy farms. We also cannot expect any youth to come work on farms which operate without regular days off. In the meantime, people on the specialized farms of as many as nine collectives in the Biržai rayon have to work more than 300 days annually--60 more than is customary in the national economy.

It's doubtful whether matters in livestock production will improve unless a five-day work week is established for all livestock workers and the milkers' schedules are rearranged to eliminate night work, if dairy farms are not completely mechanized.

An equally significant question is where will the young people who go into livestock production come from. For some time now, mass profession specialists in livestock raising have been prepared by rural occupational-technical schools. The Černiachovskis collective farm chairman, Albinas Brokorius, and managers of other farms are satisfied with this arrangement. Unfortunately, not everyone is convinced of the usefulness of occupational education, not everyone sends as many people as necessary to study.

There are still few rural occupational schools in the republic, so their number should be increased, and more mass production specialists, especially in livestock raising, should be prepared.

Naturally, farms need workers not only in livestock raising. So the rural occupational-technical schools should offer a greater choice of specializations. Especially for young women. If this is ignored, there will be even fewer young women on the farms.

Without a doubt, there will not be a shortage of qualified workers on farms whose managers understand that the rural occupational-technical school is the primary means of getting young people to come work in the fields and on the farms.

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CSO: 1809

REGIONAL

MOGILEV RESIDENTS PROTEST CITY HOUSING POLICY

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 80 p 3

[Report by I. Noviko: "The Price of a Wrong Decision"]

[Text] Mogilev--"Our settlement was started in the 1960's. There are now 300 one-story wood and brick homes for one-two families each here. We are all content with our housing and are not claiming state apartments. Suddenly the land managers come here and declare that the settlement will be pulled down. The gorispolkom has decided to put up five-story apartment houses in this spot. Has it really become so cramped in Mogilev that to put up new houses it is absolutely necessary to pull down good old ones? What is the point of this whole venture?" A. Tudakov and 55 other signatures.

I crossed the city with Mogilevskiy Gorispolkom Chairman A. Petrov, setting off for a meeting with the writers of the letter. How many vacant lots it has where housing blocks could be put up. In particular, use is not being made of a wonderful gift of nature--a unique, inimitable landscape: the Dnepr with its picturesque floodplain and the hilliness of the right bank, imparting to the city a poetic appearance.

My companion, A. Petrov, is not responsible for Mogilev's present-day appearance: he was elected gorispolkom chairman only recently. But K. Alekseyev, chief of the Architectural-Planning Administration, is no neophyte in his office. As the city's chief architect, he should have had a considerable influence on the formation of Mogilev's appearance. Should have, but did not. And the business of pulling down the Yuzhnyy settlement is on his conscience. Following K. Alekseyev's recommendation, back on 15 June 1977 the gorispolkom authorized for the Mogilevskaya TETs-2 the planning of a group of residential buildings and kindergarten-creches for 280 children in the microregion along the Orshanskoye Highway, providing for the individual homes located here to be pulled down.

"Why did you make precisely this decision"?

The chief architect gave a long and confused explanation of his reasons. Following cross-questioning and clarifications, it was finally possible to elicit just one more or less formulated argument. It amounted to the fact that all the vacant lots in the city had been designated for the erection of high-rise homes. The TETs-2, the Ferroconcrete Products Plant No 7, a treatment and labor dispensary and other "low-capacity" builders are only in a position to put up five-story buildings. The grounds of the Yuzhnyy settlement were chosen for them.

Quite a shaky argument. Why not help the small-scale builders to amalgamate, as is done in other cities, in order that they might jointly build one-two fine modern homes instead of several five-story ones? And not in the Yuzhnyy settlement, moreover, but on any of the numerous vacant lots? And who should be determining architectural-construction policy in the city: the gorispolkom administration created for this purpose or small-scale clients?

It is obvious that the decision was adopted by the Mogilevskiy Gorispolkom on 15 June 1977 without a thorough analysis of all the circumstances. Its implementation would greatly harm the city economically.

Indeed, the discontent of many of Yuzhnyy's inhabitants is justified. With the help of the state people have built their homes and garages and kept the streets clean and tidy and are planting orchards and cultivating truck gardens. They are content with their life and are not demanding new housing, which, we would note, is by no means in surplus in the city. And yet with a stroke of Chief Architect K. Alekseyev's pen the whole well developed everyday life of hundreds of families collapses. The people were exasperated, and this gave rise to numerous complaints to various authorities. The price of such unsubstantiated decisions is worth pondering.

At the same time there are also other reasons why Mogilev is not being built up in the best way. The city's population has increased 50 percent in the last 10 years. Large-scale enterprises have been erected here: the "Khimvolokno" Production Association, the Silk Cloth Combine and a number of others. The USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry allocated R25 million for the development here of a construction industry base. But the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Industrial Construction has not invested 1 kopeck of these in the modernization of the Mogilev House-Building Combine. Yet to install high-rise apartment buildings in Mogilev it is necessary to build in the house-building combine itself at least four new production facilities.

So the Mogilev construction workers are putting up depressing boxes instead of fine homes. And the sites where the high-rise buildings of original architectural design with stores and consumer service enterprises are to be accommodated stand empty.... Furthermore, the Belgosproyekt and Mogilev-grazhdanproyekt institutes are frequently behind in drawing up planning documentation, which causes a rush-work atmosphere at the construction sites which is negatively reflected in the quality of the building.

And, finally, one further fact of considerable importance. The city's master plan has not determined the sequence of the buildup of the microrayons. The designers and clients take advantage of this. They select sectors where supply lines exist. Therefore their choice more often than not falls on sites already built up with individual homes, as was the case with the settlement of Yuzhnyy.

From the Editorial Office. When this report had already been prepared for press, we were notified by the Mogilevskiy Gorispolkom that the question of building in the settlement of Yuzhnyy had been reexamined. In the next few years it is planned to erect two apartment buildings here for which 20 individual homes will be pulled down. But even 20 homes is no small number! Their demolition could be avoided if, the resources of the small-scale clients having been pooled, the multistory homes were erected on the city's existing vacant lots.

It also has to be mentioned that the gorispolkom reexamined the question of building in the settlement of Yuzhnyy not on its own initiative or in response to the public's fair demands but only after a PRAVDA correspondent had established that the complaints were justified. This step does not absolve the city soviet leaders of responsibility for their hasty, ill-considered decisions. It is all the more important to recall this because readers are reporting similar situations to the editorial office from other of the country's cities.

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CSO: 1800

REGIONAL

KIRGHIZ SPECULATORS RECEIVE STIFF SENTENCES

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 28 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by A. Sharovskaya: "Expensive Nuts"]

[Text] Antonina Ivanovna Samoylova was searching around Frunze's greengrocers for walnuts. She had called twice at her "own" trade outlet--Store No 9/4 of the "Zagottorgplodovoshch" Association--in the rayon in which she lived. But to no avail.

"What do you expect, there are no nuts in the stores," a neighbor exhibited surprise at her insistence. "You have to go to the market."

"They are very expensive there. I only have a small pension."

Antonina Ivanovna would not perhaps have hunted so persistently for the nuts: she herself only considered them in pastries, and she did not indulge her grandsons, who lived with their parents near Moscow, with this expensive delicacy. If she sent them gifts, it was more often fruit, in which Kirgizia is rich, and preserves. But she had learned recently in a chance conversation that the old, deep-seated ailment which had plagued her could be cured by a medicine obtained from walnuts. And she had obtained the prescription. But finding the nuts was proving not that easy....

From police records:

"Truck No 66-35 FII detained 26 January 1979 at 1545 in Frunze near 'Spartak' Stadium full of sacks. Vehicle driven by R. Davletshin, driver of the Frunze Truck Depot No 2. Together with him in the cab was K. Yeshmukhambetov, procurement official of the Kazakh SSR Karatal'skiy Procurement Base."

At the first interrogation Yeshmukhambetov answered in reply to the question of how the loaded vehicle proceeding, to judge by the accompanying papers, in an entirely different direction had ended up in the "Spartak" area and he, a procurement official from Kazakhstan, in the role of escort of freight being delivered to the city's greengroceries from the "Zagottorgplodovoshch" Association depot:

"I was on the point of buying these nuts. For R2 a kilo. I was taking them to the Hotel Spartak. I was staying there, and the vehicle of the Karatal'skaya Truck Depot in which I had come to Kirgizia was there. I wished to transfer the nuts and hand over the money and...."

"Hand over the money to whom? Driver Davletshin"?

"No. He was only following someone else's orders. Vladimir Ondrikov and Yusup Tambiyev, chiefs of Frunze's fruit and vegetable stores nos 9/4 and 59/4 respectively, followed us in a taxi...."

It is with good reason that we have adduced so contrasting an example: one person coming to the city in search of 1-2 kilos of a product which is not that rare in our areas, another, a stranger in the city, moreover, buying tons of it at a reasonable price, albeit double the state price. This is a highly typical situation when a speculator hits the market. And further. Everything gained from the nuts thus sold above the state value was to have gone to the instigators of this criminal alliance--the tradesmen of the stores to which the product had been sent from the depot. Nor was the buyer Yeshmukhambetov to have come off the loser. Judging by a previous deal with the same persons, he earned exactly R1 per kilo of nuts--2,815 kilos, R2,815--since he sold the nuts for R3 per kilo at his Karatal'skaya cooperative trade depot. Fabulous profits are also a characteristic feature of the most repugnant phenomenon--speculation.

The social danger of speculation is very high. Particularly because everything is, as it were, on a voluntary basis here: take it or leave it. Who has not seen in the hands of a speculator ordinary children's [kolgotki], fur hats and carpets whose prices are such as to cause one to exclaim "oh!"? But owing to necessity a person is compelled to take it, although he sees that a tremendous and in no way justified hole is being made in his budget.

How, then, do unscrupulous, callous and cruel people get hold of things in short supply and those same nuts, of which we still do not have an abundance on the shelves? The criminal case in question here throws some light on this.

The main hero of this story, typical in this type of criminal case, is Vladimir Ondrikov. The most important thing in life he considers not honest labor and people's respect but money. And he is absolutely certain that this alone elevates a person, wins him friends and creates real values.

While working as a supply man at an enterprise in Kazakhstan's Kustanayskaya Oblast Ondrikov had appropriated a tidy sum of state capital. Unwilling to part with money which did not belong to him, he went into hiding. An all-union search for him went out, and he was sought throughout the country, but he was living in Frunze. He worked as a taxi driver and subsequently switched to retail trade. Although he had not worked there very long, he

was, to all appearances, well known. This is how Yeshmukhambetov described how he "found" a partner in speculative deals in an unfamiliar city:

"I had come to Kirgizia for fruit. I was not averse to buying nuts also. But in the market they were R4-5 per kilo. I asked people at the market selling nuts where they could be bought more cheaply. Find, Volodya, they said, he works in some greengrocery or other. And they described what he looked like. I found him, and we came to an arrangement...."

The first meeting brought the "parties" quite tidy profits. Having obtained 1,700 kilos of walnuts from the "Zagotorgplodovoshch" Association depot to sell to the working people of Frunze via store No 9/4, Ondrikov thereupon sold them to Yeshmukhambetov. As a result of the deal, each pocketed R1,700.

The People's Court of Frunze's Sverdlovskiy Rayon strictly punished the speculators, sentencing both to long terms of imprisonment with the confiscation of their property. The court issued a particular order to the Kirgiz "Zagotorgplodovoshch" Association which emphasized that serious violations of the principle of personnel selection and training are being permitted in the association's system. And even after the manifest crime committed by Ondrikov and Tambiyev, the court was sent references which noted that these inveterate swindlers "enjoy authority in the collective."

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